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BETWEEN FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
AND EQUALITY 
TIMOTHY ZICK* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the dynamic intersection between freedom of 
speech and equal protection, with a particular focus on the race and 
LGBT equality movements. Unlike other works on expression and/or 
equality, the Article emphasizes the relational and bi-directional 
connections between freedom of speech and equal protection. Freedom 
of speech has played a critical role in terms of advancing constitutional 
equality. However, with regard to both race and LGBT equality, free 
speech rights also failed in important respects to facilitate equality claims 
and movements. Advocacy and agitation on behalf of equality rights 
have also left indelible positive and negative marks on free speech 
doctrines, principles, and rights. The free speech-equality relationship 
underscores several important lessons regarding reliance on speech 
rights to advance constitutional equality. Moreover, through a 
comparative analysis, the Article demonstrates that freedom of speech 
intersects in distinctive ways with different types of equalities. The 
Article’s general lessons and comparative observations carry important 
implications for future equality movements, including the current 
campaign for transgender equality. 
INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional rights are not isolated islands of liberty. In fact, many 
rights provisions are intensely relational.1 To fully understand 
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1.  See Kerry Abrams & Brandon Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights B.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (discussing some of the ways in which constitutional rights intersect and 
associate).  
ZICK FINAL 2017 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2017 1:38 PM 
14 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 12:2 
individual rights provisions, we must often examine their relationships 
with other rights guarantees. These relationships are part of an ongoing, 
dynamic, and bi-directional process in which rights facilitate, 
complicate, and change each other’s substantive meanings.2 
This Article examines the dynamic relationship between the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause. Now is a particularly appropriate time to 
focus on this relationship. In its recent marriage equality decision, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects a right of marriage equality for gays and 
lesbians.3 The opinion’s opening lines observed that the Constitution 
protects “a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow 
persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”4 And 
in response to arguments that the issue of marriage equality had not 
yet been adequately vetted in democratic venues, the Court recited the 
many opportunities that the public, lawmakers, and the courts had to 
discuss and debate the issue.5 
The Free Speech Clause is implicated in both observations. For 
many decades, gay men and lesbians fought for the right to come out 
publicly and express their sexual orientation. Further, the freedom of 
individuals and organizations to speak about, and of the public to 
debate, marriage equality was critical to the change in public and 
official attitudes that led to the marriage equality decision.6 
Marriage equality is only the most recent example of the 
transformative power of free speech and other expressive rights. As far 
back as the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, the Free Speech 
Clause has played a critical role in advancing constitutional equality 
claims.7 In the modern era, the race equality movement demonstrated 
that free speech, along with rights of assembly and press, are powerful 
means of advocating for, and to some extent achieving, equal treatment 
under law.8 Recognition and exercise of these rights helped transform 
 
  2.  See generally Timothy Zick, Rights Dynamism, U. PA. L. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2017) 
(examining how constitutional rights relate to one another in a dynamic process of change). 
  3.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). 
  4.  Id. at 2593 (emphasis added).  
  5.  See id. at 2596, 2605 (describing public discourse regarding marriage equality).  
  6.  See generally Timothy Zick, Rights Speech, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2014) (discussing 
the importance of rights discourse).  
  7.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 235 
(Yale Univ. Press 1998) (observing that Reconstruction Republicans frequently mentioned and 
invoked expressive rights in debates concerning equal protection).  
  8.  See generally HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Univ. 
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the civil rights agenda into a national agenda. Freedom of speech and 
related rights – the right to communicate anonymously and the right to 
associate – protected racial equality proponents from various forms of 
governmental abuse and censorship.9 Free speech rights also allowed 
equality proponents to make their case to the public in pointed, caustic, 
and graphic ways that advanced the cause of civil liberties. 
In similar terms, Professor Dale Carpenter has written that “[t]he 
First Amendment created gay America.”10 We must be careful not to 
over-credit constitutional litigation or Supreme Court decisions for 
broad societal changes.11 As with race equality, there are many reasons 
for the LGBT equality movement’s successes.12 However, the fact that 
advocates for gay equality have been able to rely extensively upon 
expressive freedoms both inside and outside the courts to advance their 
cause is surely among them. The Free Speech Clause and related rights 
to publish and associate have allowed LGBT persons to publicly 
identify as such, and to associate in ways that have advanced the legal 
and political cause of gay equality.13 
As the civil rights era also demonstrated, free speech rights are 
necessary but not sufficient to effect constitutional equality. As 
advocates of racial equality discovered, expressive guarantees facilitate 
but do not confer equal citizenship. Although race equality advocates 
had considerable success in First Amendment litigation, they also 
 
of Chicago Press 1965) (describing civil rights advocates’ use of expressive rights to advance racial 
equality).  
  9.  See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (holding that 
an Alabama order requiring NAACP to disclose its membership list violated the group’s First 
Amendment right of association).  
  10.  Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A 
Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1525 (2001).  
  11.  Changes that occur outside the courts are also critically important. See generally BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (Harvard Univ. Press 2014) 
(examining the many influences that facilitated the civil rights movement); MICHAEL J. 
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
RACIAL EQUALITY (Oxford Univ. Press 2004) (describing the influences and limits of Supreme 
Court litigation in facilitating constitutional equality).  
  12.  In this Article, I sometimes refer to the “LGBT equality movement” and at other times 
refer to “LGBT equality proponents.” The phrases are obviously not synonymous. Nor are they 
intended to suggest affiliation with particular activist groups or causes. In general, the Article 
assesses efforts by supporters of LGBT equality as well as their “opponents” (including groups 
that opposed gay persons’ legal and societal inclusion and acceptance) to utilize First Amendment 
litigation to pursue their goals, and to assess the effects those efforts had on Fourteenth and First 
Amendment rights.  
  13.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE 
CLOSET 98 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (discussing early cases involving speech, association, and 
press). 
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suffered notable defeats. For example, advocates discovered that the 
Free Speech Clause could not be used to de-segregate lunch counters 
or guarantee access to all protest venues.14 Similarly, as Professor 
William Eskridge has observed, some of the Supreme Court’s free 
speech decisions conveyed “an orthodoxy of compulsory 
heterosexuality” by validating “discriminatory treatment of 
homosexual speech.”15 At critical moments, free speech and other First 
Amendment claims failed to advance equality rights.16 
Indeed, insofar as equality rights are concerned, the list of free 
speech failures is quite long. For instance, First Amendment doctrine 
has generally protected forms of hateful expression directed toward 
African-Americans, gay persons, and other marginalized groups. The 
Supreme Court has held that the Free Speech Clause prohibits 
government from targeting even racist speech based on the ideas that 
it communicates.17 Social and civic institutions successfully invoked the 
First Amendment to deny admission, access, and membership to gay 
men and lesbians.18 Further, the Free Speech Clause has not imposed 
any limits on discriminatory government speech concerning race, 
homosexuality, or other matters relating to constitutional equality.19 At 
least insofar as the Free Speech Clause is concerned, governments have 
been entirely free to communicate racist, homophobic, and other 
derogatory ideas through laws discriminating against oppressed 
 
  14.  See, e.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 173–74 (1961) (invalidating breach of peace 
convictions on procedural due process grounds); Adderley v. State of Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46 
(1966) (holding that convictions for trespass based on unauthorized protest near jail did not 
violate First Amendment).  
  15.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 196. See id. at 203 (arguing that “Miller’s [obscenity] 
framework has encouraged censorship of harmless gay pornography while allowing violently 
misogynistic straight pornography.”).  
  16.  See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(overturning damages award for bisexual employee terminated for disclosing the nature of her 
sexuality); Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 771 n.5 (1977) (applying liberal interpretation of 
obscenity law to regulation of “lesbianism and sadism and masochism”).  
  17.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (invalidating hate speech 
ordinance on the ground that it discriminated based on content of speech). 
  18.  See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 581 
(1995) (application of anti-discrimination law to require parade organizers to allow gay group to 
march in parade violates organizers’ right not to be compelled to speak); Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 
U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (application of anti-discrimination law to require Scouts to admit leader who 
was openly gay violated Scouts’ right of expressive association). 
  19.  See Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 657−58 (2013) 
(positing a government nonendorsement principle based in equal protection, free speech, and due 
process); Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social 
Meaning, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1300 (2011) (suggesting that some governmental policies relating 
to gay equality implicate free speech principles).  
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minorities. In sum, as Toni Massaro has observed, “As an all-
encompassing metaphor or a complete theory of constitutional rights 
for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, [freedom of expression] falls short.”20 
 In assessing the relationship between free speech and equality 
rights, we need to look in both directions. The relationship between 
these rights is bi-directional and “stereoscopic.”21 It is important to ask 
not just what free speech rights have done for equality rights, but also 
to inquire what equality advocacy has done to free speech rights, 
doctrines, and principles.22 
 Referring to the race equality movement, Harry Kalven, Jr. 
observed that “we may come to see the Negro as winning back for us 
the freedom the Communists seem to have lost for us.”23 As the 
comment suggests, the relationship between the civil rights movement 
and expressive rights has largely been a synergistic and collaborative 
one. However, subsequent equality movements, including the LGBT 
equality movement, have demonstrated that the equality-free speech 
relationship is both complicated and complicating. As we shall see, the 
LGBT equality movement has both positively and negatively affected 
a number of free speech rights, principles, and doctrines. 
 Part I examines, in general terms, how First Amendment expressive 
rights have affected Fourteenth Amendment equality rights. Part II 
looks in the other direction and examines how equality proponents’ 
invocation of the Free Speech Clause has affected First Amendment 
principles and doctrines. Part III identifies and briefly discusses several 
general lessons regarding reliance on expressive rights to facilitate or 
obtain constitutional equality. Focusing on the bi-directional 
relationship between expressive and equality rights, it also offers a 
comparative assessment of the civil rights and LGBT equality 
movements and a forward-looking analysis of the ongoing campaign 
for transgender equality. 
 
  20.  Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 63 (1996). See also 
Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1716 (1993) (“Expression, 
equality, and privacy coexist as components of rights claims that are mutually dependent.”).  
  21.  Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth 
Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002) (observing that “the ideas of equality and 
liberty expressed in the equal protection and due process clauses each emerge from and reinforce 
one another”).  
  22.  Here, of course, I am also including the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (invalidating 
de jure racial segregation in District of Columbia schools on due process grounds).  
  23.  KALVEN, supra note 8, at 6.  
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The Article contributes to the literature on free speech and equal 
protection rights in three distinctive ways. First, it demonstrates the 
deeply relational nature of these individual rights provisions. Second, it 
highlights the processes in which these rights intersect and the effect of 
their relationship on the interpretation of free speech and equality. 
Third, the Article shows that insofar as freedom of speech is concerned, 
not all equalities are alike. Although equality movements benefit from 
their predecessors, each faces unique free speech challenges. 
No single approach can capture all of the distinctions and nuances 
in the free speech-equal protection relationship. The relationship spans 
decades, and is the product of civil rights struggles inside and outside 
the courts. The account in this Article is primarily internal rather than 
external, meaning that it focuses primarily on legal precedents and 
doctrines rather than all of the social, political, and other influences 
external to law that affect constitutional meaning. However, the 
Article’s bi-directional and comparative approaches offer a unique 
perspective on the relationship between the Free Speech Clause and 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
I. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EQUALITY 
I will begin by taking measure of the influence that the Free Speech 
Clause has had on the advancement of equal protection rights. The Free 
Speech Clause has been a critically important facilitator of equality 
politics and equal rights. It has also served a significant mediating 
function with regard to public debates about equality rights. However, 
examination of the race and LGBT equality movements highlights 
some significant limitations of the Free Speech Clause as a facilitator 
and mediator of these rights. The legacy of the Free Speech Clause, in 
terms of what it has been able to accomplish on behalf of equality, is 
somewhat mixed and complicated. 
A.  Basic First Amendment Rights – Expressive Equality 
As Justice Cardozo once observed, freedom of speech is “the 
indispensable condition . . . of nearly every other form of freedom.”24 
In this sense, free speech and equality rights are organically related. 
Indeed, one of the most critical rights recognized on behalf of equality 
proponents has been expressive equality – the right to speak, publish, 
and associate on equal terms with others. 
 
  24.  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).  
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For African-Americans, obtaining basic First Amendment rights 
was a necessary first step toward advancing equal protection. Similarly, 
as a precursor to their equality campaign, LGBT equality advocates 
looked first to establish their First Amendment rights. 
During the early stages of the civil rights movement, African-
Americans strategically used sit-ins, public protests, and assemblies to 
advance their equality agenda. These controversial tactics were often 
met with resistance, including violent forms of suppression. However, 
Supreme Court decisions protecting rights to protest, assemble, publish, 
and associate were critical to the civil rights movement’s initial and 
long-term successes.25 As detailed below, these decisions created 
breathing space for equal rights advocacy. They protected civil rights 
advocates who criticized government actors and segregationist policies. 
Recognition of First Amendment rights allowed civil rights activists to 
make public claims, and to pressure public officials to recognize and 
enforce equal rights. 
Freedom of speech, in particular, allowed African-Americans to 
stake a public claim not only to expressive rights, but also to a very early 
form of constitutional equality. Like other speakers, including whites, 
African-Americans were afforded equal access and (at least formally) 
equal treatment in public streets and parks.26 When substantive 
equality was still just a dream, equality of access to public places for 
expressive purposes had become a constitutional reality. In sum, 
expressive equality came first, followed only much later by 
advancement of substantive equality.27 
LGBT equality advocates were astute students and direct 
beneficiaries of the civil rights movement. From the beginning of their 
own movement, LGBT activists invoked the First Amendment to 
 
  25.  See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 (1965) (invalidating conviction of leader of group 
wishing to protest racial segregation); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279−80 (1964) 
(establishing high burden for public official libel plaintiffs in case involving criticism of actions 
taken by southern officials against civil rights activists); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 
238 (1963) (invalidating breach of peace convictions against civil rights protesters); NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (holding that Alabama order requiring 
NAACP to disclose its membership list violated the group’s First Amendment right of 
association).  
 26.  See Cox, 379 U.S. at 545 (invalidating conviction of leader of group wishing to protest 
racial segregation near state capitol); Edwards, 372 U.S. at 238 (invalidating breach of peace 
convictions against civil rights protesters who assembled in public streets). 
  27.  See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 20, 26 (1975) (observing that there is a “principle of equal liberty of expression . . . 
inherent in the first amendment”). 
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establish an early form of civil rights.28 Relying on civil rights era 
precedents, advocates first established expressive equality in the courts, 
and then moved to leverage this right to secure equal treatment in 
other fora.29 As during the civil rights movement, judicial recognition 
of equal rights to protest, associate, and publish greatly facilitated the 
advancement of LGBT equality.30 
LGBT activists benefitted significantly from hard-won civil rights 
precedents, including those that protected public speech rights. 
However, officials did not freely and voluntarily recognize their right 
to expressive equality. Despite the existence of civil rights precedents 
protecting the rights to assemble and associate, which African-
Americans had established only after devoting a significant part of 
their movement to First Amendment issues, LGBT individuals still had 
to devote considerable resources to First Amendment litigation.31 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, authorities raided and cracked 
down on gay bars, bathhouses, and other social establishments. 
However, owners of such establishments eventually defeated these 
actions through First Amendment litigation.32 State courts also 
overturned laws revoking charters of companies whose officers were 
involved in “organized homosexuality.”33 The federal government, 
which had a long history of discriminating against gay organizations, 
relented when the IRS granted some (but not all) gay organizations tax-
exempt status.34 Activists also successfully pressed for official and equal 
recognition of gay and lesbian college clubs and organizations.35 Again 
relying on civil rights era precedents, American Civil Liberties Union 
lawyers successfully litigated the associational rights of these groups.36 
Gay clubs flourished on American campuses.37 
 
  28.  See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 99 (“Like the civil rights movement, the gay rights 
movement necessarily turned to the law, which had recently targeted them for erasure.”).  
  29.  See id. at 123 (“The easiest issue for this period was the right of gay people to express 
themselves through public speech without fear of criminal penalty.”).  
  30.  See generally id.; Carpenter, supra note 10 (noting how First Amendment rights 
facilitated equality agenda of LGBT persons); Hunter, supra note 20 (same).  
  31.  See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 458−59 (recognizing First Amendment right to associate).  
  32.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 113.  
  33.  Id. at 115.  
  34.  Id.  
  35.  Id. at 116.  
  36.  See, e.g., Gay Student Servs. v. Tex. A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1334 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(invalidating refusal to recognize homosexual student group); Gay Students Orgs. of N.H. v. 
Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 659 (1st Cir. 1974) (invalidating school policy refusing to allow gay rights 
group to hold social activities on campus). 
  37.  See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 116 (“By 1981 four-fifths of all public colleges and 
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By reading a substantive equality guarantee into the First 
Amendment, courts allowed equality movements to establish an early 
form of equal treatment under law. Expressive equality played a critical 
function in terms of facilitating speech, press, and other expressive 
rights. As importantly, expressive equality was an early precursor to 
substantive equality. The right to speak, publish and associate on equal 
terms with others was, for extended periods of time, the only tangible 
evidence that African-Americans, gays, and lesbians enjoyed rights of 
full and equal citizenship. 
B.  Equality Activism 
The combination of expressive and equality rights produced an 
early synergy that eventually facilitated the recognition of civil rights 
in the courts and political arenas. In simple terms, equality proponents 
leveraged expressive equality rights into various types of political 
activism and, eventually, into political gains. This process, which would 
take place over many decades, would not have been possible without 
the recognition of free speech and other First Amendment rights. 
Armed with basic and fundamental free speech rights, civil rights 
activists began a long and arduous process of lobbying for substantive 
legislative and administrative protections. That lobbying was itself a 
form of protected speech. Owing to the recognition of First 
Amendment rights to protest, assemble, and publish information, civil 
rights activists were able to criticize segregation and participate in 
public debates concerning equality rights. Having executed a generally 
successful First Amendment attack on various restrictions on public 
discourse, race equality advocates pivoted to secure political and legal 
equality. 
By the 1980s, the First Amendment also protected public expression 
relating to sexuality and sexual orientation38 Speech, association, and 
press rights ultimately allowed gay men and lesbians to assert their 
political identity, create social space, and resist state repression. 
Most importantly, perhaps, First Amendment rights emboldened 
some LGBT persons to come out of the closet.39 Recognition and 
 
universities had recognized gay student groups, with a quarter of the private institutions following 
suit.”).  
 38.  See id. at 124 (noting that by 1981, gay men and lesbians were able to speak publicly 
about their sexual orientation, form groups, and publish information). 
  39.  See id. at 145 (observing that Warren Court decisions in the equal protection, free 
speech, and other areas “facilitated the explosion of coming out stories, gay rights organizations, 
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enforcement of First Amendment rights to come out in public settings 
enabled LGBT persons and groups to self-identify and organize 
publicly for the first time.40 
Expressive equality facilitated a form of visibility that put a human 
face on constitutional equality claims. It fostered the knowledge that 
neighbors, co-workers, and relatives were among the class of persons 
who were demanding equality. In this sense, the First Amendment was 
“profoundly radical – facilitating the formation of a gay nomos, a 
community of sex-positive and gender-bending idealists, and requiring 
a sex-negative America to give gays a hearing.”41 
Significantly, LGBT free speech rights were effectively established 
by 1969 – the year that the famous Stonewall riot triggered mass gay 
political mobilization.42 In the ensuing decades, like race equality 
advocates before them, LGBT activists would rely on expressive rights 
in order to communicate, organize, and agitate for political and other 
forms of substantive equality. 
First Amendment rights facilitated equality activism in other ways. 
During both the race and sexual orientation equality movements, First 
Amendment principles and doctrines allowed proponents and 
opponents to communicate privately and without fear of retaliation. In 
this sense, rights to speak and associate anonymously were critically 
important to equality activism. 
During the civil rights era, race equality opponents were 
determined to expose the identities of NAACP members in an effort 
to intimidate them into silence. Sharply rebuffing this strategy, the 
Supreme Court for the first time recognized a First Amendment right 
to associate and a corresponding right to privacy in one’s associations.43 
This allowed civil rights activists to combat state surveillance and 
protected them to some degree from official and private reprisals for 
their activism. Of course, the rights to associate and speak anonymously 
also generally allowed the Ku Klux Klan and other equality opponents 
to operate and speak privately. The repercussions of this are being felt 
even today, as anonymous hate speech flourishes in online fora. 
 
and political and social activism immediately following Stonewall”); see also id. at 141 (noting the 
connection between coming out and legal gains for homosexuals).  
 40.  See id. at 123–24 (discussing freedom of speech and its relation to the right to come out). 
  41.  Id. at 112.  
  42.  Id.  
  43.  See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (recognizing a right 
to organize anonymously for expressive purposes).  
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Nevertheless, in the short and long terms, obtaining the right to speak 
and associate anonymously was critical to equality advocacy and 
activism. 
Owing in part to the NAACP’s First Amendment litigation efforts, 
LGBT equality proponents and opponents have also been able to 
organize and communicate anonymously. In a case decided during the 
LGBT equality movement, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the First 
Amendment protects anonymous speech.44 As during the civil rights 
movement, anonymous speech rights have facilitated gay-bashing and 
other forms of derogatory speech about LGBT persons. However, the 
rights to organize and communicate anonymously have also facilitated 
political activism on behalf of LGBT equality. Although they did not 
always escape harassment by the state, gay organizations, clubs, and 
churches all benefitted from the recognition of First Amendment 
associational rights.45 
In one respect, however, the Supreme Court’s rejection of 
anonymity rights was also important to LGBT equality advocacy. After 
many gay men and lesbians had escaped the closet and come out to 
friends, neighbors, and others, some opponents of LGBT rights were 
reluctant to identify with or publicly support policies against marriage 
and other equality rights. In a case decided during the heart of the 
marriage equality debate, opponents asserted that their signatures on 
referenda petitions were protected by the First Amendment.46 Invoking 
some of the same arguments as the NAACP, signatories contended that 
disclosure of their identities would lead to threats, harassment, and 
retaliation. 
In Doe v. Reed, the Supreme Court held that a group of Washington 
citizens who signed a petition to overturn a state law granting marriage 
rights to gay couples did not have a First Amendment right to remain 
anonymous.47 Doe held that signing a referendum petition was a form 
of speech.48 However, it also held that in light of the state’s significant 
 
  44.  See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 515 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (recognizing a First 
Amendment right to communicate anonymously). 
 45.  See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 114–16 (discussing rights of clubs and associations). 
  46.  See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 200 (2010) (rejecting facial First Amendment challenge 
to Washington’s public records laws, which required disclosure of signatures for referendum 
measure providing for less than full marriage equality); ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 830 F. 
Supp. 2d 914, 952 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (rejecting similar claim brought by groups who had lobbied for 
California’s Proposition 8, which would have denied marriage equality).  
  47.  Doe, 561 U.S. at 201.  
  48.  Id. at 194−95. 
ZICK FINAL 2017 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2017 1:38 PM 
24 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 12:2 
interests in combating fraud and ensuring electoral integrity, 
application of the state public records law did not violate the 
signatories’ free speech rights.49 The Court left open whether, in a 
particular case, disclosure might give rise to threats, harassment, or 
reprisals – in which case disclosure might violate signatories’ First 
Amendment rights.50 
Despite its narrow context, Doe’s rejection of the signatories’ First 
Amendment claim was a significant victory for LGBT equality 
advocates. The decision blunted an arguably potent weapon being used 
against marriage and other forms of gay and lesbian equality. Citizens 
in many states and localities had turned to the initiative and 
referendum processes to limit gay rights generally, and marriage rights 
in particular. The Supreme Court had already invalidated one such 
measure, under substantive equal protection principles.51 
Doe did not prohibit citizens in states and localities from directly 
enacting limits on gay equality. However, the Court concluded that if 
gay equality was to be denied through self-governance mechanisms 
such as popular initiatives and referenda, the First Amendment did not 
protect citizen-lawmakers from identification, persuasion, and lawful 
forms of protest. In that sense, Doe was an important decision 
concerning both equality activism and equality rights. 
C.  Equality Discourse 
 In addition to robust political activism, in a more general sense 
freedom of speech and other expressive rights have facilitated a robust 
public discourse concerning equality rights. Early First Amendment 
victories were followed by lengthy and frequently tense public debates 
concerning the recognition and scope of constitutional equality. First 
Amendment principles and doctrines facilitated and managed public 
discourse regarding race and LGBT equality. As the Supreme Court 
emphasized in Obergefell v. Hodges, the free and uninhibited exercise 
of expressive rights, by both proponents and opponents of equality 
rights, lent democratic legitimacy to the extension of equality rights.52 
 
  49.  Id. at 201. 
  50.  See id. (emphasizing that a challenge to disclosure could succeed, if there was evidence 
that reprisal or other negative effects would follow disclosure). 
  51.  See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (invalidating Colorado statewide 
referendum that barred legal protections for gays except through constitutional amendment). 
  52.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596, 2605 (describing public discourse 
regarding marriage equality). 
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 The ability to participate in public discourse about constitutional 
rights is critically important to social and constitutional equality 
movements.53 This discourse is part of a constitutional culture that is 
focused on interpretive change.54 Constitutional movements 
communicate messages by various means, toward the ultimate end of 
altering the constitutional order. Interpretive change requires the 
communication and assessment of public claims and arguments about 
rights. 
 The First Amendment’s commitment to “robust and wide-open” 
discussion of public issues, which was first embraced by the Warren 
Court during the civil rights era, was particularly important to the race 
equality movement.55 So, again, were the rights to speak and associate 
anonymously – which were also first recognized during the civil rights 
era, and later reaffirmed during the LGBT equality movement.56 
 In conjunction with strong content-neutrality rules that barred 
officials from discriminating against civil rights speech, the First 
Amendment has generally prohibited government from suppressing 
important public discourse concerning race and other equality rights.57 
Thus, freedom of speech allowed civil rights activists to communicate 
sharp criticisms of government officials and attacks on segregationist 
policies. 
 In the United States, robust and wide-open discourse regarding 
matters of human sexuality has hardly been the norm. Indeed, during 
most of the twentieth century, courts allowed authorities to criminalize 
and suppress gay literature and erotica on the grounds that it was 
deviant and sick.58 Successful free speech claims eventually paved the 
 
  53.  See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five 
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L. J. 1943, 2030 
(2003) (observing that “the First Amendment ensures that all Americans can express their beliefs 
about the Constitution”). See also Zick, supra note 6 (discussing the virtues and benefits of 
constitutional rights discourse).  
  54.  See generally Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006) (examining constitutional movements and their reliance on public 
discourse).  
  55.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  
  56.  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); Gibson v. Fla. 
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963) (recognizing right to associational 
privacy and freedom of belief). See also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 515 U.S. 334, 357 
(1995) (recognizing a First Amendment right to communicate anonymously). 
  57.  See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (content-based restrictions on speech are 
subject to exacting scrutiny).  
  58.  See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 203 (arguing that “Miller’s [obscenity] framework 
has encouraged censorship of harmless gay pornography while allowing violently misogynistic 
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way for a more robust exchange of information regarding sexuality and 
sexual orientation. Thus, for example, by the 1980s gay publications 
were generally protected from most forms of explicit censorship.59 
 We have already seen how recognition of free speech and other 
First Amendment rights facilitated political mobilization. On a more 
general level, First Amendment ground rules made it possible to openly 
and publicly discuss issues relating to sexual orientation and human 
sexuality. As a result, the public was able to access information about 
sexual orientation and gay culture, and to more openly debate the 
merits of LGBT equality claims. 
As gay persons and sexually themed expression both began to 
escape the closet, there was an increase in the free flow of information 
about once-taboo subjects, including the sex lives of LGBT persons. 
Although the process would take decades, communications concerning 
human sexuality and sexual orientation would eventually become a 
common and ordinary subject of American political discourse.60 
 Free speech and equality rights do not always or inevitably work 
toward the shared goal of advancing equality. As detailed below, the 
First Amendment’s content-neutrality rules and principles protect not 
only the expressive activities of equality advocates, but also the 
communicative actions of its opponents and others who resist 
expansive equality claims. Under the neutrality framework, free 
speech, association, and press rights have facilitated both equality-
affirming discourse and robust opposition to full inclusion and equal 
treatment of African-Americans and LGBT persons. 
 Courts have very rarely deviated from this neutrality principle.61 
As a result, speakers have generally been free to communicate their 
opposition to race and other forms of constitutional equality. During a 
critical stage of the LGBT equality movement, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the principle that even hateful and derogatory speech is 
protected by the First Amendment. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the 
Court invalidated a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance that prohibited 
certain forms of symbolic conduct that “arouse[d] anger, alarm, or 
 
straight pornography.”). 
  59.  See id. at 118 (noting that “[b]y 1975 there were 300 identifiably gay publications, with a 
combined circulation estimated at 200,000 to 350,000 readers”).  
  60.  See Hunter, supra note 20, at 1696 (“Our claims set forth the first serious demand that 
speech about sexuality be treated as core political speech.”).  
  61.  See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266–67 (1952) (upholding a state criminal 
“group libel” law, as applied to racist propaganda). See also KALVEN, supra note 8, at 7 (noting 
the limited influence of group libel claims during the civil rights era). 
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resentment” based on traits of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.62 
The First Amendment, the Court stated, “generally prevents 
government from proscribing speech or even expressive conduct 
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.”63 
 R.A.V. confirmed that strong First Amendment neutrality rules 
apply to discourse about or concerning all subjects – including 
constitutional equality. Under the decision’s rule, public debate cannot 
be censored on the ground that certain audiences find speech offensive, 
or because speech expresses negative views regarding a person’s race, 
sexual orientation, or legal status. In sum, content neutrality rules 
protect the rights of equality opponents to communicate their views 
regarding equality. 
 Of course, as noted earlier, these rules also open the door to 
virulent forms of racist speech and gay-bashing.64 In this respect, First 
Amendment neutrality and other managerial principles may have 
made the achievement of constitutional equality more difficult. Indeed, 
some critics have contended that the First Amendment’s protection of 
hateful, derogatory, and offensive speech mismanages the balance 
between expressive and equality rights. Some critics would resolve the 
tension between expressive and equality rights differently than current 
First Amendment doctrines do.65 
 However, as both the race and gay equality examples demonstrate, 
constitutional movements benefit significantly from neutrality rules 
under which governments are prohibited from suppressing both pro- 
and anti-equality arguments. Under these rules, the power to decide on 
the limits of governmental power and the scope of constitutional rights 
ultimately rests with the people. The ability to engage in rights speech 
– communications about or concerning the recognition, scope, or 
enforcement of constitutional rights – is critically important to self-
government.66 The dynamic relationship between expressive and 
 
  62.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377, 396 (1992). 
  63.  Id. at 382. 
  64.  See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 US 443, 459 (2011) (holding that members of a church who 
protested at military funerals and conveyed messages such as “God Hates Fags” could not be held 
liable for the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
  65.  See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012); RICHARD 
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND 
THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (Harvard Univ. Press 1997); Richard Delgado, Words That 
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
133 (1982).  
  66.  See generally Zick, supra note 6 (discussing the First Amendment values associated with 
rights speech).  
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equality rights has allowed proponents to advance arguments 
concerning the recognition and extension of equality rights. At the 
same time, it has allowed opponents or defenders of the status quo to 
contest claims to equality, acceptance, and inclusion. 
 By extending equal rights to both proponents and opponents with 
regard to matters of public concern like constitutional equality, the First 
Amendment has facilitated a democratic process that is both more 
representative and more democratically legitimate. At some point, 
debates concerning particular equality rights must come to an end. 
However, as the Supreme Court indicated in Obergefell, that point 
should come only after citizens have had an opportunity to present and 
consider arguments about the recognition of rights.67 
 As part of its dynamic relationship with the Equal Protection 
Clause, the Free Speech Clause has functioned as a manager of intense 
and often uncomfortable public discourse concerning equality rights. 
Expressive equality and expressive rights ensured that information 
about equality claims and equality claimants flowed freely. First 
Amendment managerial principles protected equality and dignity-
inhibiting expression as well, as part of a public process focused on 
constitutional change. In sum, the First Amendment has provided a 
basic and general framework for debating and interpreting equal 
protection rights. 
D.  Identity Speech and Equality 
 As we have seen, constitutional equality proponents rely heavily 
on the right to be present in public places and to express their identities 
there. Visibility and voice are particularly important to oppressed 
minorities who challenge apartheid systems designed to displace or 
disappear them. Identity speech is a form of political speech: it 
communicates, through both words and symbolic acts of presence, 
opposition to segregation and unequal treatment. It defies segregation 
and displacement through voice and visibility. 
Identity speech was critical to the civil rights movement. As 
Professor Kalven has observed, the NAACP devoted significant 
resources to mak[ing] the United States Supreme Court confront the 
Negro’s constitutional claims and grievances and giv[ing] the Negro his 
 
  67.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Closing 
debate tends to close minds.”). 
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constitutional due.”68 A significant part of the NAACP’s strategy was 
to force the issue of civil rights protesters’ presence in public streets and 
other public places. Like dissident speakers before them, African-
Americans demanded public recognition of and respect for their basic 
rights to be present. 
 The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protected 
African-Americans’ rights to assemble and speak in public streets and 
parks, to engage in silent protests in public buildings, and to assemble 
for the purpose of communicating identity and equality claims.69 Thus, 
civil rights activists were generally successful in terms of gaining access 
to public fora and, hence, a degree of public visibility. 
 However, there were some important limits on the extent to which 
First Amendment rights could facilitate racial identity claims. For 
example, the Supreme Court upheld a prohibition on demonstrations 
in the area near a public jail, where students who had been arrested 
during a civil rights protest were being held.70 The Court concluded that 
even in such highly symbolic places, expressions of racial solidarity 
were not always appropriate. 
 The Court also rejected civil rights activists’ arguments that the 
Free Speech Clause protected their right to sit and be present at 
segregated lunch counters.71 The sit-in was a quintessential form of 
identity speech. Through their silent and peaceful presence, 
participants sought to communicate the injustices of segregation and 
their demand for societal and legal inclusion. As Kalven described 
them, sit-ins were a form of “self-help as a speech activity.”72 However, 
activists were not able to convince the Court that the First Amendment 
protected this form of expressive presence. Instead, the Court 
invalidated breach of peace and trespass convictions in the sit-in cases 
on due process grounds.73 
 
 
  68.  KALVEN, supra note 8, at 67.  
  69.  See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963) (invalidating breach of 
peace convictions arising from peaceful civil rights protest); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 572–
73 (1965) (overturning conviction for picketing near a courthouse); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 
131, 142 (1966) (invalidating breach of peace conviction arising from silent and peaceful protest 
in a public library reading room). 
  70.  See Adderley v. State of Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46 (1966) (upholding restrictions on 
assembly and speech near a jailhouse in which civil rights protesters were being held).  
  71.  The civil rights sit-in cases are discussed in KALVEN, supra note 8, Ch. III. 
  72.  Id. at 132.  
  73.  See id. at Ch. III (describing the Court’s due process analyses).  
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 Protection for identity speech was perhaps even more critical to 
the cause of LGBT equality.74 Unlike race, sexual orientation was not 
naturally tangible and visible. Moreover, the state’s object was not 
merely to segregate gays and lesbians in public and private places, but 
to assure that they were not openly visible and hence known to others. 
 As noted, by the early 1980s, gays and lesbians had secured basic 
First Amendment rights to publicly express their sexual orientation and 
to associate with one another. However, anti-gay discourse shifted 
toward efforts to prevent the “promotion” of homosexuality.75 Reacting 
to the movement’s constitutional and political advancements, 
governments and officials adopted an alternative position: Even if 
homosexuality was no longer considered a per se criminal offense, the 
promotion of homosexuality could still be subject to legal sanction.76 
The basic logic of this no promotion of homosexuality (or “no promo 
homo”) position was that “the state should be free to express its own 
republican vision of a happily and heterosexually married society.”77 
Once gays and lesbians sought to extend expressive equality to 
facilitate broader visibility and acceptance, the state asserted its own 
power to reframe the issue in a way that would keep closet doors closed 
for decades more.78 
 Like race equality advocates, gay and lesbian equality advocates 
were generally free to speak and assemble in public for the purpose of 
making identity claims.79 However, under the no-promotion regime, 
many gay and lesbian persons were prevented from informing others, 
in both public and private settings, about their sexual orientation. 
Courts held that the dismissal or failure to hire an openly gay or 
 
  74.  Attention to gay identity concerns increased in the late 1970s, when states began to 
consider measures prohibiting the advocacy of homosexuality. See Hunter, supra note 20, at 1703–
04 (describing California’s proposed Briggs Initiative, which would have permitted the firing of 
any school employee who advocated, solicited, encouraged, or promoted private or public 
homosexual activity). 
  75.  See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 115 (observing that the First Amendment “not only 
protected [gay] organizations from direct suppression but also helped frame the discourse of 
indirect suppression”).  
  76.  See Hunter, supra note 20, at 1703−05 (discussing early policies). 
  77.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 216−17.  
  78.  See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay 
Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327 (2000) 
(presenting a detailed history of the rhetorical shift in anti-gay discourse).  
  79.  See, e.g., Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 491 F.2d 498, 501 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that public 
school teacher’s disclosure of homosexuality in response to media questions was protected 
speech); Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 654 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding that public 
employee’s public advocacy for equal rights for gays and lesbians was protected speech).  
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bisexual employee was justified under the government’s authority to 
ensure efficient services and reduce disruption in the workplace.80 They 
also uniformly rejected the argument that dismissal of gays and lesbians 
from military service under the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy 
(“DADT”) violated their First Amendment free speech rights.81 In 
essence, courts reasoned that the DADT policy regulated conduct, not 
speech, and that the law’s explicit reliance on speech to prove intent to 
engage in dischargeable conduct (i.e., sodomy) did not violate the First 
Amendment. 
 As a result of these holdings, gay employees and soldiers were 
essentially forced to pretend they were heterosexual, and were 
prohibited from discussing homosexuality and gay rights while at work, 
in the barracks, or even at home.82 Litigants, activists, and prominent 
scholars argued that the public employment dismissals and other 
adverse official actions based on gay and lesbian self-identification 
violated the First Amendment.83 Taking particular aim at the military’s 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, scholars contended that the government 
had imposed a penalty on gay employees and service members based 
solely upon their communications (“I am gay”) and expressive acts 
 
  80.  See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1984) (overturning 
damages judgment in favor of public school teacher who was dismissed for discussing her 
bisexuality with students); Childers v. Dall. Police Dept., 513 F. Supp. 134, 139 (N.D. Tex. 1981) 
(upholding dismissal of officer based in part on his open homosexuality and public gay activism). 
See also ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 195 (arguing that courts had mistakenly deferred to 
authorities in part owing to a fear that the First Amendment itself would become sexualized — 
i.e., sexually expressive material and information would become generally protected). 
  81.  The Clinton administration adopted the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, which allowed 
gay service members to remain in military service so long as they did so in secrecy. The policy was 
codified at 10 U.S.C. §654 (b) (repealed). Under the policy, any statement by a service member 
that indicated he was gay created a rebuttable presumption of intent to engage in homosexual 
activity — a dischargeable offense. For courts of appeals cases rejecting the First Amendment 
argument, see generally Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Cal. Army 
Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996); Able 
v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en 
banc); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 
(9th Cir. 1991); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989); and Ben-Shalom v. 
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989). The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy was repealed in 2010. 
See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515 (2010) 
(providing for repeal 60 days after report by Secretary of Defense and certification by the 
President and military officials).  
  82.  See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Political Representation and Accountability Under Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1633, 1644−50 (2004) (providing examples of the scope of the 
presumption under the military’s policy, including application to conversations with family 
members, sessions with chaplains and psychotherapists, and public statements).  
  83.  See generally David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: 
First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
319 (1994).  
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(including public displays of affection and private sexual conduct), and 
had thus discriminated against gay speech based on its content.84 
Equality proponents argued that gay and lesbian identity speech 
belonged within the First Amendment’s broad protection for political 
dissent and sexual expression. They also argued that this protection was 
consistent with traditional First Amendment expressive values, that the 
regulatory justifications invoked by the government were content-
based and failed to meet the appropriate level of scrutiny, and that by 
facilitating expressive chill and heckler’s vetoes in workplaces and 
military barracks, the courts were undermining sexual peace and 
contributing to sexual neuroses.85 
 For gays and lesbians, a high-profile decision invalidating the 
military policy on free speech grounds would have been an occasion for 
“dancing in the streets.”86 It was not to be. As indicated in federal 
appeals courts across the nation, the First Amendment arguments 
failed. The same result occurred in many, though not all, employment 
cases. Expressive equality guaranteed basic rights to access and speak 
in public fora, to publish, and to associate. However, equality advocates 
were not able to fully extend these guarantees to some critical acts of 
self-identity. 
 Here, then, is one context in which the synergies between 
expressive and equality rights apparently broke down. Professor 
Eskridge has described the DADT cases as a test not just of the limits 
of gay and lesbian rights in the United States, but “as a test of the first 
amendment itself.”87 If free speech rights extended to sociopolitical and 
racial radicals, he argued, they must also extend to sexual radicals. 
However, as the civil rights sit-in cases show, racial radicals were not 
always successful in this regard either. To some extent, the denial of 
identity speech protection cut across equality movements and claims. 
 If, as equality advocates contended, identity speech is a form of 
political expression, the Free Speech Clause did indeed appear to fall 
 
  84.  See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 174 (arguing that from the perspective of a “sexualized” 
First Amendment, sodomy and other acts that communicate sexual identity qualify as protected 
expressive conduct). See also Cole & Eskridge, supra note 83 (same).  
  85.  See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 176−95. 
  86.  See Harry J. Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning 
of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (quoting Meiklejohn, who reportedly 
stated that New York Times v. Sullivan, which invalidated strict libel standards in a case involving 
criticism of racially discriminatory official acts, was “an occasion for dancing in the streets”). 
  87.  Id. at 196.  
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short – at least in the short term.88 The fact that the free speech 
guarantee did not protect basic forms of identity speech limited to 
some degree its ability to facilitate or advance constitutional equalities. 
E.  Exclusion and Equality 
 The relationship between freedom of speech and equality is 
complicated in other respects as well. One of the things that we have 
learned, in particular as a result of the LGBT equality movement, is 
that the First Amendment can actively impede as well as facilitate 
equality. In particular, the Free Speech Clause protects an expressive 
right to exclude others from participating in certain types of 
organizations and associations. 
It is a well-settled First Amendment principle that government 
cannot compel private individuals or groups to communicate state-
sanctioned thoughts or ideas.89 The First Amendment protects rights 
not to speak and associate with others. As the LGBT equality 
movement demonstrated, these rights affect the manner in which free 
speech and equality rights relate to one another. 
 Those who dissent from or resist equality may invoke the First 
Amendment as a defense to anti-discrimination laws and regulations. 
As discussed in Part III, this is one point at which the race and 
gay/lesbian equality narratives diverge.90 During the civil rights era, 
neither opponents nor proponents of racial equality relied upon First 
Amendment rights to exclude. By contrast, during the LGBT equality 
movement, First Amendment protections against compulsory 
expression and association were relied upon as a means of exclusion, 
opposition, and dissent.91 
 
 
  88.  See Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in LEE C. BOLLINGER & 
GEOFFREY R. STONE, ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 187 (2002) 
(observing that identity claims may have been successful in the longer term by “associating the 
persuasive power of the First Amendment with the movement to recognize the moral and 
constitutional rights of the homosexual community”). See also Hunter, supra note 20, at 1703 
(describing how no promo homo policies produced a shift in judicial analysis from seeing 
homosexuality as conduct to consideration of gay speech “as the advocacy of ideas” about 
homosexuality). 
  89.  See West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641−42 (1943) (invalidating compulsory flag 
salute laws).  
  90.  See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
  91.  See Eskridge, supra note 78, at 1330 (noting that private groups started making no promo 
homo arguments during the 1980s, in part to avoid application of anti-discrimination laws 
protecting homosexuals). 
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Exclusionary First Amendment claims have arisen in a number of 
different contexts. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and 
Bisexual Group of Boston,92 organizers of a St. Patrick’s day parade in 
Boston excluded members of GLIB, an association of gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual Irish-Americans, from marching in the parade under their own 
banner. GLIB wanted to march in the parade “as a way to express pride 
in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals, 
to demonstrate that there are such men and women among those so 
descended, and to express their solidarity with like individuals” who 
had sought to march in New York City’s St. Patrick’s Day parade.93 
Although the Boston parade was a public accommodation to which 
state anti-discrimination laws applied, the Court held that parade 
organizers had a First Amendment right to exclude GLIB from 
marching as a unit under their own banner.94 The Court concluded that 
the parade was expressive,95 and that the organizers had a right to 
maintain control over their own communicative message and to 
express opposition to gays’ “claim to unqualified social acceptance.”96 
 Hurley exposed a deep and problematic tension between 
expressive rights and anti-discrimination laws. The decision suggested 
that free speech rights could outweigh the equality interests 
represented in anti-discrimination laws. 
The Supreme Court addressed this tension again five years later, in 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.97 In Dale, the Court held that the 
compulsory inclusion of James Dale, who had publicly identified as gay 
in an interview given to a local newspaper, violated the Boy Scouts’ 
First Amendment right of expressive association.98 The Court 
concluded that the organization sought to propound a message of 
“moral straightness” and “cleanliness” that was incompatible with 
homosexual conduct and relationships.99 It held that the Free Speech 
Clause prohibited the government from compelling the Boy Scouts to 
admit a member whose public statements and sexual identity were  
 
  92.  See generally 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
  93.  Id. at 561.  
  94.  Id. at 574−75.  
  95.  Id. at 568−70.  
  96.  Id. at 574.  
  97.  See generally 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
  98.  Id. at 653−54.  
  99.  The Court deferred twice to the Boy Scouts — once in determining what message it 
propounded and again in determining whether Dale’s presence interfered with its expressive 
activities. See id. at 649−651. 
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contrary to its own organizational messages.100 In response to the 
dissenters’ observation that homosexuality had gained greater societal 
acceptance and that governments had taken affirmative steps to 
protect gay rights, the Court observed that speakers had a First 
Amendment right to voice a different – and less accepting – point of 
view regarding homosexuality and gay rights.101 
Dale created uncertainty regarding the relationship between free 
speech and equality rights – in particular, with regard to the scope of 
the expressive association right.102 In recent cases, the First 
Amendment-based anti-discrimination exemption has been raised by 
businesses refusing to serve gay and lesbian customers.103 Thus far, 
courts have not been very receptive to the argument. For example, a 
wedding photographer who refused to photograph a same-sex 
commitment ceremony lost a First Amendment challenge to state anti-
discrimination laws.104 The photographer claimed that application of 
the state’s anti-discrimination laws compelled expression (and violated 
her religious free exercise rights). After lower courts rejected these 
claims, the Supreme Court denied review.105 
In the wake of the marriage equality ruling, businesses will likely 
continue to bring defensive and exclusionary free speech (and religious 
freedom) claims. A broad free speech-based exemption could 
significantly affect gays’ and lesbians’ access to goods and services. A 
wide variety of businesses – jewelers, salons, restaurants, bakers, inns,  
 
  100.  Id. at 651−52. As it had done in Hurley, the Court also relied to some extent on the 
compulsory speech doctrine. In a portion of the opinion that was separate from the discussion of 
compelled association. See id. at 654 (“[T]he presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would 
just as surely interfere with the Boy Scout’s choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its 
beliefs.”).  
  101.  See id. at 660. (“The First Amendment protects expression, be it of the popular variety 
or not.”). 
  102.  See ANDREW KOPPELMAN WITH TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO 
DISCRIMINATE? HOW THE CASE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA v. JAMES DALE WARPED THE 
LAW OF FREE ASSOCIATION 29 (2009) (“If there is a stopping point, the court does not say where 
it is located.”). 
  103.  Lower courts have been reluctant to extend Dale to its logical conclusions in non-
commercial cases. See id. at 49−51 (discussing post-Dale cases); id. at 52 (“The lower courts were 
well on their way to confining Dale to its facts”). 
  104.  See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 440 (2012) (rejecting argument 
that application of state anti-discrimination laws to photographer violated First Amendment 
speech rights).  
  105.  See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (2013), cert. denied, 2014 WL 
1343625.  
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grocers, etc. – might have an expressive right to refuse service to these 
customers on the ground that service would compel speech.106 
 Defenders of LGBT inclusion and equality have also invoked the 
First Amendment for their own exclusionary ends. For example, relying 
on Hurley and Dale, several law schools challenged the Solomon 
Amendment, a federal law that conditioned federal funds on the 
schools’ permitting military recruiters (who were at the time enforcing 
the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy) to access campus resources on the 
same terms as other employers. The schools argued that the Solomon 
Amendment compelled them to espouse anti-gay messages and 
associate with discriminatory actors.107 
 In Rumsfeld v. Forum For Academic and Institutional Rights, the 
Supreme Court unanimously rejected the law schools’ First 
Amendment arguments.108 The Court held that the Solomon 
Amendment did not compel the law schools to convey any anti-gay 
message; nor, the Court held, did the law compel the schools to 
associate with military recruiters.109 In fact, the Court characterized the 
law schools’ claim that the Solomon Amendment compelled speech as 
one that “trivializes” the First Amendment right against compelled 
expression.110 Unlike the presence of the gay Scout leader in Dale, the 
Court held that the mere presence of military recruiters on law school 
campuses did not threaten to interfere with the schools’ right of 
expressive association.111 
 In Dale, the Court accused the law schools of attempting to 
“stretch a number of First Amendment doctrines well beyond the sort 
of activities these doctrines protect.”112 It also criticized the law schools’ 
 
  106.  See KOPPELMAN, supra note 102, at 62 (“The scope of the Dale right remains deeply 
uncertain.”). See generally Justin Muehlmeyer, Toward a New Age of Consumer Access Rights: 
Creating Space in the Public Accommodation for the LGBT Community, 19 CARDOZO J. L. & 
GENDER 781 (2013). For an argument that the First Amendment should protect at least some 
businesses from compelled service of gay customers, see generally Susan Nabet, For Sale: The 
Threat of State Public Accommodations Laws to the First Amendment Rights of Artistic Businesses, 
77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1515 (2012). 
  107.  For discussion of these arguments, see KOPPELMAN, supra note 102, at 54 (“the actual 
core of the argument for interference with expression in the Solomon litigation was simply not 
credible”); see also Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Challenging the Wisdom of Solomon: The 
First Amendment and Military Recruiting on Campus, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 205 (2004) 
(urging the Court to invalidate the Solomon Amendment on First Amendment grounds). 
  108.  547 U.S. 47, 70 (2006).  
  109.  Id.  
  110.  Id. at 62.  
  111.  Id. at 70. 
  112.  Id.  
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attempt to “cast themselves” as just like the speakers in Hurley and 
Dale, concluding that the comparison “overstates the expressive nature 
of their activity and the impact of the Solomon Amendment on it, while 
exaggerating the reach of our First Amendment precedents.”113 FAIR 
left little doubt that Dale’s exclusionary principle had limits. The 
decision was a ringing defeat for proponents of gay and lesbian 
inclusion and equality. 
 Although Dale imposed some limits on the ability of private 
organizations to exclude groups that did not support gay and lesbian 
inclusion, state colleges and universities were able to successfully 
invoke a similar authority. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,114 
Hastings Law School successfully defended its exclusion of a student 
organization that rejected homosexual and other pre-marital sexual 
activity as part of its creedal membership requirements. The law school 
required that all registered student organizations receiving official 
recognition and support accept “all comers.”115 The Christian Legal 
Society (“CLS”)required that its members sign a “Statement of Faith” 
and agree to live their lives in accordance with the group’s principles, 
which prohibited sex outside of marriage and “unrepentant 
homosexual conduct.”116 The Court held that the public law school 
could exclude CLS from official recognition, as a registered student 
organization, because it limited its membership to those who accepted 
its religious beliefs – including the belief that homosexuality is sinful.117 
 CLS claimed that the law school’s denial of an exemption from the 
all-comers policy violated its First Amendment speech and 
associational rights.118 After concluding that CLS’s associational and 
speech claims were effectively one and the same, the Court declined to 
apply Dale and other expressive association precedents.119 Instead, the 
Court held that the registered student organization program was a 
limited public forum.120 In such a forum, the Court held, the law school 
could exclude student organizations so long as its policy was reasonable 
and viewpoint-neutral.121 The Court held that the law school’s interests 
 
  113.  Id.  
  114.  See generally 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
  115.  Id. at 2979−80. 
  116.  Id. at 2980.  
  117.  Id. at 2978.  
  118.  Id. at 2981.  
  119.  Id. at 2985−86.  
  120.  Id. at 2986.  
  121.  Id. at 2988.  
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in ensuring access to all students, policing its non-discrimination policy, 
encouraging tolerance, cooperation and learning, and communicating 
its support for state laws banning discrimination, were all reasonable 
justifications.122 It concluded: “Hastings, caught in the crossfire between 
a group’s desire to exclude and students’ demand for equal access, may 
reasonably draw a line in the sand permitting all organizations to 
express what they wish but no group to discriminate in membership.”123 
 As the Court noted, the all-comers policy did not prevent CLS from 
meeting on campus, or operating off campus.124 Nor did the policy 
prevent CLS from communicating its faith-based principles, or 
associating only with those who shared its core religious beliefs. 
However, from CLS’s perspective, the all-comers policy conditioned 
official school benefits on the mandatory inclusion of members who did 
not share its creedal views regarding homosexual conduct. In dissent, 
Justice Alito raised the concern that so-called “all-comers” policies 
would facilitate exclusion of unwanted groups on campus and interfere 
with the core expressive rights of a variety of dissident organizations.125 
 To summarize, then, in Hurley, Dale, FAIR, and Martinez, the First 
Amendment was invoked for explicitly exclusionary purposes. This 
initiated a distinctive dynamic between free speech and equality rights. 
Hurley and Dale upheld the exclusion of gays and lesbians from civic 
activities and organizations. However, as noted and detailed below, the 
scope of the expressive exemption from anti-discrimination laws 
remains unclear. FAIR demonstrated that advocates of equality and 
inclusion could not use the exclusionary claim to block what they 
considered to be illiberal groups from campus – at least not when the 
group was the United States military and the measure compelling 
presence was a federal spending condition. By contrast, Martinez relied 
on First Amendment public forum principles to uphold the exclusion 
of groups that did not support full and equal inclusion for gay men and 
lesbians in recognized campus groups. 
 Among the exclusionary precedents, only Martinez can be 
characterized as any sort of victory for gay and lesbian equality. 
 
  122.  Id. at 2989−91.  
  123.  Id. at 2993. The Court also concluded that the all-comers policy was viewpoint-neutral. 
  124.  See id. at 2986 (observing that the law school’s policy relied on the “carrot” of subsidy, 
not the “stick” of compulsion or regulation).  
  125.  See id. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority decision rests on the 
principle that there is “no freedom for expression that offends prevailing standards of political 
correctness in our country’s institutions of higher learning”); id. at 3009 (“disapproval of CLS 
cannot justify Hastings’ actions”).  
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However, it is not clear what, if any, tangible benefits gays and lesbians 
obtained as a result of its holding. Symbolically, Martinez signaled state 
support for inclusion and equal opportunity for all students. But it does 
not appear that gay and lesbian students are clamoring for inclusion in 
Christian student organizations, or that they benefit significantly from 
“all comers” policies. Thus, the First Amendment right to exclude has 
primarily benefitted groups that were either not prepared or not willing 
to accept gays and lesbians as full members. 
F.  Government Speech and Equality 
 Thus far, the discussion has focused on the First Amendment’s 
functions as they relate to private expression concerning equality rights. 
Governments and public officials have also been active and influential 
participants in public discourses about constitutional equality. Thus, it 
is important to take this aspect of the free speech-equality dynamic into 
account. 
 Governmental rights speech has profoundly affected the 
relationship between free speech and equality rights. Laws and official 
policies have communicated state viewpoints regarding the legitimacy 
and scope of constitutional equality claims. De jure racial apartheid was 
itself an expression of official racism and support for inequality. No 
promo homo laws and policies similarly communicated governmental 
support for discrimination against gays and lesbians. The federal 
Defense of Marriage Act,126 the United States military’s “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” regulations, and state educational policies forbidding the 
promotion, teaching, or even mention of homosexuality in sex 
education and other classes all expressed official support for gay and 
lesbian inequality.127 
 The most obvious place to search for limits on anti-equality 
expression is the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.128  
 
  126.  Pub. L. No. 104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (1996), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
  127.  See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 362−71 (collecting data on state no promo homo 
educational and other policies). 
  128.  See Dorf, supra note 19, at 1293−98 (discussing equality concerns relating to official 
enactments regarding sexual orientation). See also Helen Norton, The Equal Protection 
Implications of Government’s Hateful Speech, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 159 (2012) (addressing 
equal protection limits on government speech regarding homosexuality and gay rights); Deborah 
Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing 
equal protection concerns relating to laws regarding homosexuality); Elizabeth S. Anderson & 
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 
1531−51 (2000) (focusing on equal protection and religious non-establishment limits on 
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However, here we are considering what, if any, function the Free 
Speech Clause might serve in terms of limiting government speech 
concerning equality. The answer to that question, in both the civil rights 
era and throughout the movement for gay and lesbian equality, is none 
at all. Although government speech about equality has had a profound 
and mostly negative impact on equality rights, the First Amendment 
has not been invoked or relied upon to limit this harm. In sum, the Free 
Speech Clause has been silent in the face of discriminatory government 
speech. 
 As the Supreme Court has stated, “If the government is engaging 
in [its] own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no 
application.”129 Thus, although the Free Speech Clause limits the 
government’s power to regulate private speech, it imposes no limits at 
all on governmental communications – including communications 
concerning the equality rights of its citizens.130 
A few scholars have advanced approaches under which the Free 
Speech Clause might limit some discriminatory government speech.131 
Michael Dorf has emphasized the distinctly expressive harms that flow 
from official denials of equality – whether based on race, gender, sexual 
orientation, or some other ground.132 Dorf argues that part of the harm 
in discriminatory laws and regulations lies in the coercion of private 
speech.133 He offers as an example a law requiring that all non-
heterosexuals wear a visible pink triangle in public places.134 Dorf 
argues that the harm produced by such a law is partly expressive – it 
compels the wearer to self-identify as non-heterosexual, and 
communicates an “unmistakable message of second-class 
citizenship.”135 He argues that while laws denying marriage or other 
 
government speech).  
  129.  Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 640, 647 (2009).  
  130.  See, e.g., Zick, supra note 6, at 4 n.8 (raising but bracketing the question whether there 
are limits on government speech concerning constitutional rights); Carol Sanger, Seeing and 
Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 
360−61 (2008) (asking “when or to what extent may the state persuade a person not to exercise a 
constitutional right?”). 
  131.  See Tebbe, supra note 19, at 657−58 (positing a government nonendorsement principle 
based in equal protection, free speech, and due process concerns); Dorf, supra note 19, at 1300 
(observing that “[s]ome of the constitutional harm done by a requirement that people wear a 
badge of inferiority sounds in freedom of expression”). 
  132.  See Dorf, supra note 19. 
  133.  Id. at 1278. 
  134.  Id. at 1275.  
  135.  Id.  
ZICK FINAL 2017 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2017 1:38 PM 
2017] FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EQUALITY 41 
forms of equality for gays operate more subtly, they nevertheless 
produce similar harms.136 
 Ultimately, Dorf concludes that the harm in discriminatory laws is 
only partially rooted in First Amendment compelled speech concerns. 
As he observes, First Amendment compelled speech doctrine does not 
“fully capture the special harm” visited upon gays and others subject to 
official discrimination.137 At its core, the harm visited upon 
homosexuals is the same sort of subordination visited upon African-
Americans under Jim Crow and similar regimes – the imposition of 
second-class status. Still, the social meaning of the legal exclusion is 
expressive, in that it communicates a status or state of inferiority.138 
 Professor Nelson Tebbe has identified a related principle that 
could restrain or limit some discriminatory governmental expression. 
The limit is based, in part, on the First Amendment’s Free Speech 
Clause. Tebbe argues that a principle of “nonendorsement” cuts across 
several constitutional doctrines and contexts.139 The nonendorsement 
principle, which prohibits government from denying full and equal 
citizenship to individuals, is based on First Amendment concerns.140 
Thus, Tebbe posits that at least some free speech theorists would likely 
condemn racialized government speech, on the ground that it distorts 
democratic discourse.141 Under the nonendorsement principle, 
racialized government speech “can constitute speakers as disregarded 
or disabled participants in political life.”142 Tebbe claims that this affects 
fundamental First Amendment rights “to participation in the political 
community, including the freedom of expression.”143 
 Like Dorf, Tebbe argues that the “constitutional harm worked by 
[discriminatory laws] could be seen as expressive, at least in part.”144 
Tebbe also identifies a deeper and more general link between freedom 
of speech and equal protection. He observes that the nonendorsement 
principle “suggests a concern for full citizenship in free speech law that 
is parallel to the more familiar value of equal citizenship in equal 
 
  136.  Id. at 1308.  
  137.  Id. at 1298.  
  138.  See id. at 1344 (arguing that same-sex marriage bans should be subject to heightened 
scrutiny “because the members of an identifiable victim group reasonably understand those laws 
as branding them and their relationships as second-class”).  
  139.  Tebbe, supra note 19, at 653.  
  140.  See id. at 650 (government nonendorsement principle “cuts across multiple provisions”).  
  141.  Id. at 666.  
  142.  Id. at 667.  
  143.  Id. at 667−68.  
  144.  Id. at 676. 
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protection.”145 Tebbe contends that bigoted governmental speech does 
not merely impose equality-based harms on its subjects, but inflicts 
liberty-based harms as well.146 Official expression that singles out and 
denigrates particular persons or classes of persons, he argues, 
“impos[es] a legal construction on their political participation that 
qualifies as a constitutional harm.”147 For this reason, in various 
contexts the nonendorsement principle limits what the collective polity 
wishes to communicate.148 
 In these accounts, the First Amendment is doing serious work. Dorf 
and Tebbe have highlighted the expressive harms that are associated 
with discriminatory laws and policies. In essence, their work has 
identified another possible point of intersection between freedom of 
expression and equality. When thinking about the relationship between 
freedom of expression and equality, we ought to account for the fact 
that official enactments that discriminate against individuals may 
offend both rights. 
Although courts have not expressly acknowledged that the First 
Amendment limits government speech, they have not been oblivious 
to the expressive power of discriminatory enactments. Insofar as racial 
equality is concerned, the idea that segregation was “inherently 
unequal” was based, in part, on the stigma expressed by segregation.149 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has implicitly recognized expressive 
values and concerns in its decisions concerning gay and lesbian rights. 
According to the Court, the concept of “liberty” relied upon in 
Lawrence to strike down Texas’s same-sex sodomy law “presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, 
and certain intimate conduct.”150 Moreover, all four of the Court’s 
major gay rights precedents – Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and 
Obergefell – rested in part on the proposition that the challenged laws 
stigmatized homosexuals, declared them unequal, communicated 
animus toward them as a class, or harmed identity interests.151 
 
  145.  Id. at 697 (emphasis in original).  
  146.  Id. at 707.  
  147.  Id.  
  148.  Id. 
  149.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). See Hellman, supra note 128, at 13 (“A 
legal classification violates Equal Protection if the meaning of the law or practice in our society 
at the time conflicts with the government’s obligation to treat us with equal concern.”). 
  150.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).  
  151.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (“the amendment seems inexplicable by 
anything but animus toward the class it affects”); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“When homosexual 
conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation 
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Nevertheless, these were only implicit references to expressive 
harms and interests, rather than formal free speech-based limits on 
discriminatory government speech. Just as it failed to provide coverage 
for certain kinds of private identity speech and allowed for exclusion 
of gay men and lesbians, the First Amendment imposed no limits or 
constraints on official anti-equality expression. 
II.  EQUALITY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 The relationship between free speech and equality rights is bi-
directional. Part I focused on the First Amendment’s effects on the 
recognition and enforcement of Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
However, as both the civil rights and LGBT movements demonstrated, 
First Amendment agitation on behalf of constitutional equality rights 
also significantly affects First Amendment doctrines and rights. The 
precedents established during these movements facilitated the 
advancement of Fourteenth Amendment rights. But in several respects 
they also expanded and illuminated First Amendment rights. This Part 
focuses not on what First Amendment-protected agitation did for or on 
behalf of constitutional equality, but rather what agitation concerning 
Fourteenth Amendment rights did to the First Amendment. The bi-
directional nature of the relationship between free speech and equality 
rights is complex and involves various factors and influences. As in Part 
I, the focus below is primarily on internal rather than various external 
social, political, or other influences. 
A.  Caveats and Limitations 
 The analysis in this Part is inspired by the work of Professor Harry 
Kalven, Jr. Unlike most scholars of his era, who studied the effects of 
NAACP litigation on constitutional equality rights, Kalven focused his 
attention on what civil rights litigation did to First Amendment 
rights.152 We will also examine what effect the LGBT equality 
movement has had on First Amendment principles and rights. Before 
proceeding in this direction, some caveats are in order. 
 
 
to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres”); 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“The avowed purpose and practical effect 
of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon 
all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States”); 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (linking liberty and “identity”).  
  152.  See generally KALVEN, supra note 8. 
ZICK FINAL 2017 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2017 1:38 PM 
44 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 12:2 
 First, I do not make normative judgments concerning litigants’ or 
activists’ strategic and other decisions to invoke First Amendment 
rights in particular equality-related cases. Rather, I seek to assess, as 
objectively as possible, the effects of these various invocations on First 
Amendment rights, doctrines, and principles. 
 Second, I am interested in the overall effect that equality litigation 
has had on First Amendment rights, rather than in discovering any 
specific causal relationships. During the civil rights era, First 
Amendment litigation was systematic and strategic.153 Hence, many 
effects on expressive rights can be fairly traced to the leaders and 
litigants in that movement. With regard to LGBT equality, the situation 
is somewhat more complex. While some of the precedents were 
products of coordinated efforts, others clearly were not. Moreover, 
some of the most important precedents during this era were not the 
products of gay equality proponents’ actions, but those of opponents 
and dissenters who sought First Amendment protections of their own. 
Again, the idea is not to assign responsibility for the First Amendment 
effects, but rather to identity and analyze them. 
 Third, any assessment concerning positive or negative effects on 
First Amendment rights obviously raises questions about relevant 
baselines. When assessing effects, the analysis below generally adopts 
status quo First Amendment doctrinal baselines and understandings. 
Thus, it asks whether, in light of conceptions of freedom of speech, 
association, etc. that were in place at the time the movement or 
campaign began, the conflict over equality strengthened, clarified, or 
diminished First Amendment guarantees.154 
 Finally, although First Amendment precedents from the civil rights 
era are now firmly established, in some cases it may be too early to 
assess the long-term First Amendment impact of the campaign for gay 
and lesbian equality. Some of the precedents in this area are relatively 
recent. Litigants and courts are still working out their applications and 
boundaries. 
 
  153.  See id. at 66 (“One of the most distinctive features of the Negro revolution has been its 
almost military assault on the Constitution via the strategy of systematic litigation.”). 
  154.  Again, the analysis here is more on the macro than the micro level. Even the iconic New 
York Times v. Sullivan, which I count as a gain in terms of free speech rights, has been subject to 
some important criticisms. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782 (1986). 
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B.  Neutrality and Anti-Orthodoxy Principles 
The frequent intersection between free speech and equality claims, 
doctrines, and rights has significantly influenced the recognition and 
development of core Free Speech Clause rules and principles. Indeed, 
the modern conception of freedom of speech cannot be understood 
without reference to its frequent and consequential intersections with 
Fourteenth Amendment equality claims and principles. These dynamic 
intersections fundamentally altered government’s relationship with 
private speech and revealed the central commands of the Free Speech 
Clause. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the judicial, political, and cultural 
attention to equality rights ultimately moved the Supreme Court to 
interpret the Free Speech Clause as including a “neutrality” 
principle.155 During the civil rights era, content neutrality rules became 
a central component of the modern conception of freedom of speech. 
It is difficult to overstate the significance of this change. The free speech 
neutrality principle revolutionized free speech doctrine by importing 
equality norms and values into Free Speech Clause doctrines. 
In early cases, courts viewed claims that government had 
discriminated against speakers primarily as equal protection claims.156 
As they developed and applied free speech content neutrality rules, 
however, courts would come to treat freedom of speech and equality 
claims on separate but related tracks – with official discrimination 
acting as the joist connecting the two. Each provision would henceforth 
be interpreted to protect an individual right to receive equal treatment 
at the hands of government – in a broad sense, under the Equal 
Protection Clause, and in terms of free speech and other expressive 
rights, under the Free Speech Clause. 
LGBT activists and litigants invoked and expanded principles of 
governmental neutrality. First Amendment litigation established that 
government could not suppress gay and lesbian speech, press, or 
association rights based on subject matter or viewpoint.157 As discussed 
earlier, this meant that speech about sexual orientation, homosexuality, 
and gay and lesbian culture flowed more freely into marketplaces. At 
 
 155.  See generally Karst, supra note 27. See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech 
in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 273−80. 
 156.  See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (reviewing picketing restrictions under 
Equal Protection Clause). 
 157.  See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 174 (discussing LGBT First Amendment litigation). 
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the same time, the LGBT equality campaign fortified basic First 
Amendment principles of neutrality and anti-orthodoxy. 
Equality advocates were not the only ones interested in resisting 
official orthodoxy with regard to sexual orientation and gay-lesbian 
rights. As discussed earlier, organizations and individuals resisted gay 
and lesbian inclusion and social acceptance. Dissenters objected to 
extending full equality rights to racial minorities and LGBT persons. 
Some of this dissent took the form of hateful and derogatory speech. 
This brought free speech and equal protection rights into tension and 
conflict with one another. 
The Supreme Court’s general solution to this tension has been to 
reaffirm neutrality and anti-orthodoxy principles. Only once did the 
Court deviate from this position, and the exception was short-lived. In 
Beauharnais v. Illinois the Supreme Court upheld a state group libel 
law that prohibited speakers from communicating race-based 
criticism.158 By contrast, the Court’s decision in R.A.V., which 
invalidated a local hate speech ordinance, applied a strong content-
neutrality rule.159 Beauharnais is plainly the outlier here. Its holding and 
reasoning are difficult to reconcile with subsequent decisions 
protecting robust, offensive, and even hateful expression. Thus, but for 
the Beauharnais exception, the Free Speech Clause, as interpreted, has 
required protection even for derogatory anti-equality speech. 
The Court has extended protection for dissenters’ rights to 
organizations.160 The central principle in cases such as Hurley and Dale 
was that government cannot impose official orthodoxies regarding gay 
acceptance, inclusion, and equality. That very old and venerable First 
Amendment principle was not altered even in cases involving the 
exclusion of individuals from civic activities and organization based on 
their sexual orientation.161 By recognizing and reaffirming expressive 
autonomy and associational liberty, these precedents limited the 
government’s ability to impose an official orthodoxy regarding private 
obligations to accept and include others. They preserved a private space 
for dissent. 
 
 
 158.  See generally Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).  
 159.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (content-based restrictions on 
speech are “presumptively invalid”). 
 160.  See supra Part I.E. 
 161.  See West Virginia v, Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641−42 (invalidating compulsory flag salute 
laws). 
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Neutrality and anti-orthodoxy have been consistent themes in 
Supreme Court decisions decided during the decades in which gay and 
lesbian equality has been under consideration. R.A.V., Hurley, and Dale 
all rejected the premise that government could enforce what seemed to 
be prevailing views regarding minority inclusion and acceptance. In 
doing so, these decisions confirmed and fortified a commitment to 
robust, uninhibited, and wide-open discussion concerning 
constitutional equality. 
I have argued that this First Amendment-based commitment to 
neutrality ultimately advanced equality, in part by helping to create a 
political process that was free from governmental bias. Additionally, by 
insisting on equal respect for dissenting points of view regarding 
equality, the neutrality principle also reinforced the “central meaning” 
of the First Amendment. Thus, once again, both freedom of speech and 
equality have been deeply affected by their intersection with one 
another. 
There have been some outliers and exceptions in the expressive 
association context. In particular, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez is 
somewhat difficult to square with a full commitment to government 
neutrality regarding homosexuality and sexual orientation.162 The law 
school’s “all comers” policy is neutral in the sense that all student 
groups are formally treated equally. However, the policy is, by 
definition, somewhat at odds with the ideal that the state cannot dictate 
what is orthodox in religion, politics, or other realms.163 Perhaps the 
rapidly turning societal tide in terms of gay inclusion and equality 
influenced the result in Martinez. Or, perhaps, the fact that the case 
involved government subsidies rather than anti-discrimination laws 
convinced the Court that dissenting groups’ associational autonomy 
was not truly implicated. In any event, Martinez is perhaps an exception 
to what was otherwise a strong judicial commitment to First 
Amendment neutrality and anti-orthodoxy principles. 
Although their presence bears mentioning, the existence of a few 
exceptions does not undermine the generally strong commitment to 
government neutrality on display during the race and gay-lesbian 
equality movements. Beauharnais appears to have had very little effect 
on race equality discourse. The ramifications of CLS are not yet clear, 
 
 162.  See discussion supra notes 153−64 and accompanying text. 
 163.  See John D. Inazu, The First Amendment’s Public Forum, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 
1178−80 (2015) (critiquing Martinez on ground that the decision fails to adequately consider the 
speech and associational interests of student groups denied recognition under the policy). 
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but it does not appear that the decision has chilled speech or imposed 
any sort of official orthodoxy regarding sexual orientation except 
perhaps on some campuses. Together, then, part of the legacy of the 
equality movements has been confirmation of the core principle that 
government must remain neutral with regard to the content of equality 
speech and the views of defenders and detractors. 
C.  Other Free Speech Principles 
In addition to the First Amendment’s neutrality principle, other 
central free speech principles were announced during the civil rights 
era. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court examined 
the extent to which newspapers and others reporting on civil rights 
violations could be held civilly liable under strict state law libel rules. 
The Court refashioned the libel laws of the fifty states in a manner that 
comported with First Amendment free speech and free press rights. In 
doing so, it announced that the “central meaning” of the First 
Amendment was that debate on public issues should be “uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open.”164 The Court also denounced “seditious libel” 
laws, which punished speech critical of government, as a discredited 
form of censorship. 
Along with the neutrality principle, identification of the First 
Amendment’s “central meaning” and the denunciation of seditious 
libel have had a profound effect on free speech rights in the United 
States. The mediating principle that public debate – including debate 
concerning constitutional equality – should be “robust, uninhibited, 
and wide-open” has been critical to the nation’s consideration of racial 
and other forms of equality. The principles announced in Sullivan have 
also influenced free speech doctrines relating to defamation, advocacy 
of unlawful action, and the regulation of offensive speech. Moreover, 
the Court’s articulation of speech rights contributed to the 
development of some of the central justifications for freedom of 
speech, including the notions that free speech is necessary to self-
government and facilitates the search for truth. 
Cases like Sullivan prompted Professor Kalven to predict that “we 
may come to see the Negro as winning back for us the freedoms the 
Communists seemed to have lost for us.”165 Kalven was referring to a 
 
  164.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) (identifying the central meaning 
of the First Amendment). 
  165.  KALVEN, supra note 8, at 6. 
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period during the 1950s when dissident Communists and other radicals 
routinely lost First Amendment challenges to convictions based on 
speech criticizing the draft or U.S. war efforts.166 The NAACP and civil 
rights protesters “won back” rights to dissent and criticize government 
that are now central to the concept of free speech and self-government. 
Subsequent equality movements, including the LGBT movement, 
cemented this legacy and confirmed the central meaning of the First 
Amendment. First Amendment litigation by LGBT activists did not 
merely advance the cause of equality; it also kept the Free Speech 
Clause and Equal Protection Clause in conversation – in the courts, 
public venues, and publications. LGBT equality advocates did not need 
to “win back” free speech rights that had been lost. Rather, their goal 
was to rely upon and fortify dissenters’ rights that had been bequeathed 
to them by the civil rights movement. The LGBT equality movement 
demonstrated that protection for “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” 
discourse could extend to (at least some forms of) sexual dissent. 
The relationship between freedom of speech and equality was not 
merely a one-way instrumental interaction. Civil rights movements 
relied on freedom of speech and other expressive rights to advance 
equality. However, in the process, they changed those rights in ways that 
have had lasting consequences for the interpretation and enforcement 
of American free speech rights. 
D.  Public Fora and Public Protest 
In somewhat more specific and pragmatic terms, the intersection of 
freedom of speech and equality had tangible effects on First 
Amendment doctrines relating to access to public properties and rights 
relating to public protest. As a general matter, equality agitation has led 
to clearer and stronger rights of access to public properties such as 
streets and parks. This access has been critically important, legally and 
culturally, to public protest and other expressive rights. It is a central 
component of modern free speech doctrine and jurisprudence. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, civil rights protesters created vital 
breathing space in the nation’s public streets and other venues for the 
distinct purpose of engaging in political protests and other expressive 
activities.167 Race equality advocates did not start from scratch in the 
 
  166.  See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 511 (1951) (rejecting free speech defense 
to charges of communist conspiracy). 
 167.  See TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING EXPRESSIVE LIBERTIES IN 
PUBLIC PLACES 106−110 (2009) (discussing the influence of civil rights protests on rights of public 
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endeavor to obtain access to public streets and parks. In particular, they 
benefitted from the litigation campaign of Jehovah’s Witnesses, who 
during the 1930s and 1940s successfully challenged an array of 
discriminatory restrictions on speech in public venues.168 
The recognition of public speech rights during the civil rights era 
dovetailed with the Court’s identification of the “central meaning” of 
the First Amendment and, as discussed earlier, was critically important 
to the success of the civil rights movement. However, these precedents 
were not just significant in terms of their effect on the civil rights 
campaign. They also indelibly affected free speech rights. Through its 
strategic and systematic First Amendment campaign, the NAACP 
strengthened and expanded rights of access and contributed to the 
eventual development of the “public forum” concept.169 Supreme 
Court and lower court precedents during the Warren Court era held 
that speakers had a First Amendment right to access public streets and 
other places for purposes of speech, assembly, and press activities.170 
These First Amendment victories simultaneously advanced the cause 
of equality and installed the building blocks for a First Amendment 
public forum doctrine that guaranteed minimal and equal access to 
important public venues. For an American public just tuning in to the 
revolution, Supreme Court decisions upholding civil rights protesters’ 
free speech rights, including in cases where the possibility of violence 
was real, demonstrated the strength and power of public protest 
rights.171 
The civil rights era public forum and public protest precedents have 
helped a long list of movements, causes, and dissenters – labor, gender 
equality, LGBT equality, peace and antiwar movements, Occupy Wall 
Street protests, and Black Lives Matter activists. Like Sullivan’s 
“central meaning” pronouncement, these precedents set the First 
Amendment on a bold new course. They established a fundamental 
right to access and use public streets, parks and other places for the 
purpose of engaging in expressive activities. They also signaled to 
 
presence and contention). 
 168.  See Daniel Hildebrand, Free Speech and Constitutional Transformation, 10 CONST. 
COMM. 133, 150−59 (1993) (describing the Witness free speech cases). 
  169.  See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 12–13 (describing civil rights cases and their influence on public forum doctrine). 
  170.  See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (recognizing a right of 
access to public streets). 
  171.  See, e.g., TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 
1954−63 (1988); TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG 
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011). 
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police forces across the nation that they had an obligation to protect 
free speech and other First Amendment rights – even in the face of 
public opposition to speaker or cause. 
In sum, doctrines and principles relating to public speech rights 
were indelibly altered as a result of equality advocacy and contention. 
The civil rights movement simultaneously used these new rights to 
advance equality and fundamentally altered understandings of the Free 
Speech Clause and other First Amendment rights. Subsequent 
generations of speakers and causes have relied on these robust public 
speech rights to participate in public dissent, contention, and protest. 
E.  Association, Autonomy, and Anonymity 
Other changes to free speech rights occurred as a result of litigants’ 
and activists’ reliance on First Amendment claims in their pursuit of 
Fourteenth Amendment equality rights. As a result of these 
intersections, some new First Amendment rights were recognized while 
others were strengthened and illuminated. 
For instance, in NAACP v. Alabama, the Supreme Court recognized 
a right to associate with others for expressive purposes.172 This right for 
the first time extended First Amendment protection beyond the 
individual to groups, organizations, and institutions. Communists and 
other radical groups had been unsuccessful in terms of claiming First 
Amendment protection for their expressive activities. The Court’s 
concern that Alabama and other states were targeting the activities of 
the NAACP and other groups to suppress civil rights advocacy 
contributed to the recognition of a new First Amendment right to 
associate for expressive purposes – a right ancillary to freedom of 
speech. This First Amendment protection for group activities has 
facilitated a diversity of social and political collective action by political 
parties, religious groups, and social organizations.173 
Later equality movements have left their own distinctive marks on 
the First Amendment right of association. In early stages of the LGBT 
equality movement, advocates relied on the right of association 
recognized during the civil rights era. They invoked the right of 
association to resist crackdowns on gay and lesbian bars and to 
advocate for the rights of student groups on public campuses. 
 
  172.  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (recognizing right of 
anonymous association). 
  173.  See generally JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF 
ASSEMBLY (2012) (discussing the importance of rights of assembly and association). 
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However, the dynamics of the intersection between LGBT equality 
and the right of association differed from the civil rights era experience. 
Most notably, groups and institutions that opposed or resisted LGBT 
participation in events and membership invoked their own right of 
expressive association to defend against application of anti-
discrimination laws. 
Thus, as discussed earlier, the Supreme Court also recognized and 
enforced an expressive right not to associate with others. During the 
later stages of the LGBT equality movement, the First Amendment 
freedom of expressive association was invoked as a sword rather than 
as a shield. The Boy Scouts and other organizations successfully 
repurposed the right of association as a right of dissent – a right not to 
associate with gay men and lesbians. 
Some commentators have argued that this exclusionary use of the 
right to associate destabilized or muddled associational rights by failing 
to clearly identify the parameters and limits of the right not to 
associate.174 Thus, as Andrew Koppelman has observed, Supreme Court 
precedent could plausibly be read to support either or both of the 
following propositions: “All antidiscrimination laws are 
unconstitutional in all their applications,” or “Citizens are allowed to 
disobey laws whenever obedience would be perceived as endorsing 
some message.”175 
In Boy Scouts v. Dale, the Court did appear to change its 
fundamental approach to the right not to associate, which had been 
invoked unsuccessfully in race and gender exclusion cases.176 The 
Court’s approach to associational rights was more deferential to 
organizational concerns and less committed to enforcing the letter or 
spirit of anti-discrimination laws.177 Stated differently, in the rough form 
of constitutional balancing the Court seemed to be performing, free 
speech interests appeared to count for more than equality interests. At 
the same time, the Court’s unanimous rejection of the law schools’ 
 
  174.  For criticisms of the Court’s treatment of associational rights, see INAZU, supra note 173; 
see generally Andrew Koppelman, Signs of the Times: Dale v. Boy Scouts of America and the 
Changing Meaning of Nondiscrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819 (2002). 
  175.  Koppelman, supra note 174, at 1819.  
 176.  See N.Y. State Club Assn. Inc. v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (invalidating racially 
discriminatory exclusion policies); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 
537, 544 (1940) (same). See also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628−29 (1984) (holding 
that application of state anti-discrimination law to require Jaycees to admit women as full voting 
members did not violate the First Amendment). 
  177.  See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000) (deferring to organization 
with regard to its purported message).  
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challenge to the presence of military recruiters on campus suggested 
that the right not to associate did indeed have some limits. In sum, the 
Court embraced a broad First Amendment right not to associate – 
although just how broad remains unclear. 
LGBT equality supporters also litigated cases that unsettled the 
First Amendment right of association. Recall that in Christian Legal 
Society v. Martinez the Court upheld Hastings Law School’s “all 
comers” policy for recognized student groups. In Martinez, the Court 
refused even to consider the Christian group’s associational rights 
claim. It held that any associational rights had essentially “merged” 
with the group’s free speech claims, which the Court then resolved 
according to First Amendment public forum doctrine.178 Critics of 
Martinez have argued that the Court ignored and discredited a separate 
and distinct First Amendment right.179 Martinez suggests that public 
forum principles can sometimes subordinate associational rights – but 
again, it is unclear when that may occur. 
Cases and conflicts adjudicated during the LGBT equality 
movement also affected the First Amendment right not to be 
compelled to speak. This was not a new right, like the right to associate. 
Indeed, First Amendment protection against compelled speech has a 
long and venerable history.180 During the civil rights era, free speech 
conflicts primarily related to official efforts to stifle or suppress race 
equality expression and advocacy. First Amendment attention tended 
to focus on rights to speak, assemble, and criticize government. By 
contrast, during certain phases of the LGBT equality movement, the 
focus shifted to rights not to speak.181 As with the right not to associate, 
opponents of LGBT inclusion relied on the right not to speak in order 
to defend against application of anti-discrimination laws.182 As 
discussed earlier, so did proponents of LGBT equality, who resisted 
what they viewed as compulsory laws commanding them to adopt anti-
LGBT messages. 
 
 
  178.  Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 680 (2010). 
  179.  See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associations and Forums: Situating CLS v. Martinez, 38 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543, 549 (2011) (arguing that the Court essentially ignored freedom of 
association rights).  
  180.  See West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641−42 (1943) (invalidating compulsory flag 
salute laws). 
  181.  See generally Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CAL. L. REV. 761 (2012).  
  182.  See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 574 
(1995). See also Dale, 530 U.S. at 654 (citing Hurley as “illustrative”).  
ZICK FINAL 2017 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2017 1:38 PM 
54 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 12:2 
During the LGBT equality movement, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the basic right not to be compelled to adopt and 
communicate state-imposed messages. As noted earlier, the Court 
affirmed general neutrality and anti-orthodoxy principles. It also 
elaborated on the importance and scope of the right not to 
communicate. 
In Hurley, the Court held that a group that had organized an Irish-
American pride parade could not be compelled to communicate the 
message of a gay pride contingent. It emphasized the core autonomy 
right every person and organization has to formulate and express 
messages. Hurley suggested that this right was broad and inviolable. 
However, in FAIR, the Court unanimously rejected the claim that 
hosting military recruiters violated the law schools’ right not to 
speak.183 The Court explained that the right only extended to instances 
in which the government forces a belief or message on an unwilling 
speaker who has no real opportunity to resist or dissent.184 It reasoned 
that merely allowing military recruiters on campus and providing them 
with assistance, for example reaching out to students to schedule 
interviews, did not compel speech.185 
Whether FAIR will limit or narrow the right against compulsory 
speech remains to be seen. But as with the right not to associate, the 
presence of equality advocacy and equality interests complicated – and 
may have narrowed – the interpretation of compulsory speech rights. 
Finally, in terms of effects on First Amendment rights, equality 
advocates won recognition for First Amendment rights to associate and 
communicate anonymously. During the civil rights era, acts of private 
and official intimidation had threatened to inhibit or suppress civil 
rights activism. In NAACP v. Alabama, the Supreme Court recognized 
that the First Amendment right to associate included the right to 
associate anonymously. Two years later, the Court held that the 
distributor of a civil rights flyer had a right to communicate with the 
public anonymously.186 These precedents were not only important to 
the facilitation of equality rights. They also significantly expanded First 
Amendment rights to organize and speak anonymously.187 
 
  183.  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 61−62 (2006). 
  184.  Id. 
  185.  Id. 
 186.  Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). See also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 
515 U.S. 334, 341−42 (1995) (affirming right to publish information anonymously). 
  187.  See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (recognizing right to 
ZICK FINAL 2017 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2017 1:38 PM 
2017] FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EQUALITY 55 
The LGBT equality movement confirmed the importance of 
anonymous speech rights, and generally left these rights as it found 
them – with one potential exception. As discussed earlier, in Doe v. 
Reed, the Supreme Court held that a state law requirement that petition 
signatures collected by anti-marriage equality referendum proponents 
be treated as public records did not violate the Free Speech Clause.188 
The Court held that in the context of public lawmaking, the state’s 
interests in detecting and preventing fraud were sufficient to outweigh 
the First Amendment right to engage in anonymous speech. 
Although it rejected the First Amendment claim, Doe does not 
appear to significantly undermine the right to speak anonymously. The 
decision does not question the existence of a First Amendment right to 
engage in anonymous speech. Nor does it fully embrace transparency – 
even for referenda and other popular lawmaking mechanisms. Doe 
narrowly applies election law precedents and leaves open the 
possibility that petition signatories subject to real threats of reprisal 
could prevail on a right to anonymous speech claim. 
The contemporary system of American free speech would be 
unrecognizable without the significant contributions of equality 
movements. The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s produced 
landmark rulings that shaped the First Amendment’s central doctrinal 
and normative principles for decades to come. It secured recognition 
for rights to criticize government in the strongest terms, to access public 
streets and parks for expressive purposes, to litigate on behalf of 
equality, to associate with others for expressive purposes, and to engage 
in anonymous speech. 
The LGBT equality movement, which again pressed the First 
Amendment into frequent service to advance its equality claims, 
affirmed many of these rights but also complicated a few of them. In 
particular, perhaps the most lasting First Amendment impact from the 
LGBT equality movement concerns the right of association – more 
accurately, the right not to associate with those who hold different 
viewpoints and opinions. Although the contours of that right are still 
being worked out, the conflict over LGBT equality has undoubtedly 
influenced our understanding of the rights to associate and to resist 
associating with others. 
 
organize anonymously for expressive purposes).  
  188.  Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 202 (2010). 
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F.  Self-Identification and Free Speech 
During both the race and LGBT equality movements, identity 
speech rights were frequently – and in both cases largely unsuccessfully 
– litigated in courts. As discussed in Part I, neither equality movement 
was able to achieve First Amendment recognition for identity speech 
rights.189 
The idea that an individual’s mere presence or self-identification 
has independent expressive significance received little support from 
courts adjudicating First Amendment claims during the race and 
LGBT equality movements. Although a few concurring justices found 
the argument appealing in some civil rights sit-in cases, a majority of 
the Supreme Court declined to rely upon the Free Speech Clause. 
Appeals courts were similarly unimpressed with the argument that 
revealing one’s sexual orientation was protected speech.190 Clearly, 
there were no First Amendment gains on this front. The question is 
whether litigants did any affirmative damage to First Amendment 
liberties by losing these arguments. 
Recall that we are using status quo baselines to assess free speech 
effects. The argument that sitting at a lunch counter was an expressive 
act was novel when it was made. Breach of peace and trespass laws 
made unwanted presence an unlawful act. In these respects, the Court’s 
decision to rely upon due process rather than free speech precedents 
and principles in the sit-in cases is understandable. 
The rejection of these speech claims did not create any widely 
applicable principle or precedent that could be invoked to undermine 
similar claims in the future. With regard to public buildings, civil rights 
protesters were sometimes successful in terms of asserting a First 
Amendment right to be present.191 In that respect, civil rights activists 
actually left something of a positive legacy insofar as expressive 
presence was concerned. Federal and state anti-discrimination laws 
eventually resolved the right to be present in public accommodations 
issue, rendering the free speech argument superfluous. 
In light of this history, gay men and lesbians who unsuccessfully 
challenged “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and other no promo homo policies 
certainly did not relinquish any established free speech rights. Their 
 
 189.  See supra Part I.C. 
 190.  See id. 
 191.  See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (invalidating breach of peace 
conviction arising from silent and peaceful protest in a public library reading room). 
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claim that coming out was a form of political speech was also somewhat 
novel when raised. However, it remains the case that no promo homo 
litigation failed to establish a link between identity speech and identity 
politics. 
In order to assess this aspect of the LGBT’s First Amendment 
legacy, more recent precedents must also be considered. Recall that in 
case like Hurley and Dale, LGBT groups and individuals sought 
inclusion in parades and social organizations owing specifically to what 
their inclusion would communicate, while opponents of inclusion 
invoked the First Amendment to protect against presence owing to its 
expressiveness. Hurley tacitly recognized that gays’ and lesbians’ 
presence might communicate something the parade organizers did not 
wish to say.192 Dale went further, explicitly acknowledging that the Boy 
Scouts’ objection to Dale was that his very presence in the organization 
would communicate ideas and viewpoints contrary to the 
organization’s own.193 
In this sense, in the long term the LGBT equality movement 
arguably did establish that mere presence can be expressive. By 
asserting First Amendment identity claims, litigants laid some 
important groundwork for arguments that official discrimination 
causes distinctive free speech harms.194 That First Amendment principle 
could benefit future equality claimants, including transgender 
individuals who assert gender identity claims. 
III. THE FREE SPEECH – EQUALITY INTERFACE  
 The discussion in Parts I and II highlights several general lessons 
or observations regarding the dynamic intersection between First 
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. This final Part begins 
by summarizing those lessons or observations. It next examines some 
of the differences between the free speech-equality dynamics during 
the race and LGBT equality movements. Finally, the Part briefly looks 
forward – to present and future equality claimants, in particular 
transgender persons, and the intersection between freedom of speech 
and equal protection during their movements. 
 
 192.  Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 574 
(1995).  
 193.  Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 649−51 (2000). 
 194.  See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 19, at 1308 (“Laws banning same-sex marriage also appear to 
brand citizens as second-class and to enlist those very citizens in the enterprise.”). 
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A.  Lessons 
 Part I considered a variety of functions the First Amendment, as 
interpreted by courts, has performed in the discourse about racial 
equality, sexual orientation, and gay equality. It concluded, for example, 
that expressive rights have generally been efficacious facilitators of 
equality claims and relatively effective managers of public discourse 
about sexual orientation and gay equality. On the other hand, the First 
Amendment did not fully protect identity speech rights, was an 
awkward mediator of certain conflicts relating to gay inclusion, and was 
silent in the face of discriminatory government speech. Part II showed 
that expressive rights have also been significantly affected by their 
invocation and exercise during quality campaigns. This experience 
highlights ten general lessons concerning the use of expressive liberties 
to advance constitutional equality claims.195 
1.  Free Speech Rights Are Antecedent Rights 
 Freedom of speech is “the indispensable condition . . . of nearly 
every other form of freedom.”196 One of the many ways in which this 
statement is accurate is that a prolonged period of open public debate 
is a condition precedent for the recognition of constitutional rights.197 
In order to engage effectively in that debate, claimants must have 
access to public places, enjoy expressive equality rights, and have 
protection against governmental censorship and intimidation. 
 During the critical civil rights period, equality claimants invoked 
First Amendment rights in an opening bid to achieve social recognition 
and equal rights. Once recognized, these rights facilitated the 
distribution of information about claimants and their grievances, 
allowed for appeals to public opinion, and framed a democratic process 
that ultimately led to social, political, and constitutional change. 
Perhaps most importantly, free speech rights created the necessary 
breathing space for political mobilization on behalf of constitutional 
equality. 
 
  195.  Some of these insights may also apply to other rights relationships, such as that between 
freedom of expression and religious liberties. See generally Zick, supra note 2 (examining the 
dynamic intersection of constitutional rights). 
  196.  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).  
  197.  See Reva B. Siegel, The Jurisgenerative Role of Social Movements in United States 
Constitutional Law, at 11 (for publication with the papers of the Seminario en Latino América de 
Teoria Constitucional y Politica (SELA), June 10–12, 2004, Oaxaca, México) (emphasizing the 
need each movement has “to express its values as public values” and to persuade citizens and 
officials to recognize claims).  
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 During the race equality movement, activists relied substantially 
on public speech rights to generate public and official support for the 
recognition and enforcement of equality. Similarly, in their earliest civil 
rights phase, LGBT activists sought recognition of a “new” 
constitutional right to equal treatment under law – a right that had been 
denied them for several generations. Instead of focusing initially on 
substantive equality, they first sought recognition of basic rights to 
speak, publish, and assemble on equal terms. 
 As the equality example demonstrates, free speech rights are 
antecedent rights. Without them, constitutional discourse is not 
possible. Without expressive equality, substantive equality is not 
attainable. 
2.  Free Speech Rights Are Critical Catalysts for Social Change 
First Amendment rights are critical to the recognition and exercise 
of all constitutional rights. However, they play an outsize role with 
respect to claims based upon equality values and principles. Free 
speech rights are especially important to claimants who seek social 
acceptance, respect for their basic dignity, and social and political 
integration. 
 Equality claims rely, in significant part, on the expression and 
acceptance of claimants’ identity. In order to obtain equal status and 
treatment, African-Americans, gay men and lesbians, women, and 
religious minorities must be visible and vocal. Equality claimants thus 
rely heavily on expressive and associative activities geared toward 
gaining different kinds of public recognition. 
 Over time, free speech rights function as powerful catalysts for 
changing public opinion and perceptions. The civil rights movement 
demonstrated the intimate connection between speech rights and 
changing perceptions of status and equality. Although Brown v. Board 
of Education was an iconic decision, televised images of protests, sit-ins, 
and the violence that followed these activities had as much, or more, to 
do with increasing social awareness of inequality and changing public 
perceptions.198 The official responses to political and social agitation 
shocked the national conscience and changed social perceptions. 
 
  198.  See KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 440−41 (noting the rise in public sympathy for civil 
rights causes after violent scenes were televised); ACKERMAN, supra note 11, at 95 (noting that 
“television made all the difference, transforming the terrible scenes into an ugly symbol that 
shocked viewers throughout the nation”).  
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 Thus far, the LGBT equality movement has confirmed the dynamic 
and catalytic function of First Amendment rights. Rapid changes in 
public perceptions of gay and lesbian persons, and of gay and lesbian 
equality, resulted in large part from information distributed in public 
forums, publications, and media. The free flow of information protected 
by the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause facilitated a 
robust and wide-open debate that has led to transformative legal and 
constitutional changes. The rapidity of change can be traced, in 
important respects, to the recognition and exercise of free speech rights. 
3.  Free Speech Rights Are Cumulative and Iterative 
First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, privacy, and 
association are cumulative and iterative. In their separate quests for 
constitutional and other forms of equality, movements rely on a 
tradition of First Amendment rights. Each movement also adds 
something distinctive to the free speech tradition. 
Free speech rights accumulate over time. Equality and other rights 
movements do not begin in a First Amendment vacuum. They piggy-
back on prior movement successes. Free speech rights become 
established and entrenched through a layered and dynamic process. 
This is not to say that subsequent movements do not have some of the 
same challenges to overcome in terms of censorship and speech 
restrictions. However, newer movements can generally rely on 
precedents and social norms that are a product of First Amendment 
and accumulation. 
Thus, free speech rights are part of a shared American tradition. We 
can trace a direct lineage from Jehovah’s Witnesses, to civil rights 
protesters, to gay and lesbian equality activists. In terms of reliance on 
First Amendment rights, each movement has built on the gains of its 
predecessors to advance the cause of religious, racial, and sexual 
equality. Civil rights protesters invoked the early precedents of the 
1930s and 1940s to achieve important early expressive victories. 
Throughout their movement, gays and lesbians relied on this 
jurisprudential and constitutional tradition to defeat sex censorship 
and repression. 
Although each movement relied on past precedents, each also 
added something distinctive to the cumulative tradition. Civil rights 
protesters relied on self-help, in the form of sit-ins and peaceful 
demonstrations. Gay and lesbian activists opposed sex censorship in 
various forms, through cross-dressing, publication of sexually explicit  
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information, and other means. In this way, activists both fortified and 
expanded on the achievements of previous equality proponents. 
4.  Free Speech Rights Are Necessary, But Not Sufficient 
Although First Amendment guarantees are necessary to advance 
equality rights, they are not sufficient. Free speech-based claims lack 
the independent legal and moral force necessary to fully guarantee 
other constitutional rights, including constitutional equality. 
As both the race and LGBT equality movements have shown, 
officials do not simply capitulate when there is majority opposition to 
equality claims. Obtaining public assembly and free speech rights was 
merely the first step in a long process. Subsequent contests focused on 
quasi-public and private places, such as libraries and lunch counters, 
military barracks, and schools. Governments resisted expansion, and 
equality proponents responded with new sets of First Amendment 
claims. They used free speech claims as constitutional wedges to create 
additional social and political space for their respective movements. 
Opponents and detractors dug in, to preserve the status quo. 
Race and LGBT equality proponents successfully used free speech 
and other First Amendment claims to pry open some doors. However, 
apartheid regimes did not crumble as a result of public protests or other 
expressive activities. As noted, in the end, equality proponents were 
unable to leverage speech rights to penetrate some important social 
and cultural spaces. 
Obtaining free speech rights is a necessary first step on the path to 
full equality. These rights help initiate public conversations about 
equality. They frame and manage a democratic process. However, free 
speech rights do not inevitably lead to social acceptance, political gains, 
or constitutional equality. In sum, free speech rights facilitate equality 
discourse and frame equality conflicts, but do not determine outcomes. 
The LGBT equality movement has confirmed the limitations and 
complexities associated with reliance on free speech rights to advance 
equality. Full protection for derogatory anti-gay speech, criminalization 
of identity speech, constitutionally sanctioned forms of social exclusion, 
and discriminatory government speech have all undermined, delayed,  
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or denied full equality for gays and lesbians. As Toni Massaro stated, 
“As an all-encompassing metaphor or a complete theory of 
constitutional rights for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, [freedom of 
speech] falls far short.”199 
5.  Free Speech Rights Are Subject to Institutional and Other 
Limits 
First Amendment speech, association, and press rights facilitate 
equality rights – but only up to the point that judges, officials, and the 
broader public are willing to accept their recognition or expansion. This 
lesson confirms the view that courts – including the Supreme Court – 
act less as reformation and change agents than as institutional “pilers-
on.”200 This is one reason why some commentators warn that social 
movements should not over-rely on courts to advance their agendas.201 
The failure of identity speech claims is a good example. For a variety 
of reasons, only some of which were doctrinal, civil rights litigants were 
unable to convince the Supreme Court that sit-ins, which threatened 
private property rights, were a form of expressive conduct.202 Similarly, 
the failed challenges to no promo homo policies exposed the short-
term futility of relying on expressive constitutional rights to defeat 
deep-seated prejudices and biases. 
As Nan Hunter observed, gay and lesbian identity claims “further 
complicated the expression-equality dynamic.”203 Just as they 
apparently could not perceive the expressiveness of racial presence at 
segregated lunch counters, judges had difficulty identifying the 
communicative nature of gay and lesbian self-outing.204 
During the early- to mid-1990s, it was one thing for judges to 
recognize gays’ right to speak openly in public about their sexuality, to 
associate with one another in clubs and bars, and even to publish erotic 
material. However, at the time, pleas for broader inclusion and 
 
  199.  Massaro, supra note 20, at 63. See also Hunter, supra note 20, at 1716 (“Expression, 
equality, and privacy coexist as components of rights claims that are mutually dependent.”). 
  200.  See Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 80 VA. L. 
REV. 1537, 1551 (2004) (“[V]iewed from the perspective of social movements . . . courts are least 
effective at open-field tackling and most effective when piling on.”).  
  201.  See id. at 1546 (“Generally speaking, however, reform movements are well advised not 
to rely primarily on courts to push their agenda.”).  
  202.  See KALVEN, supra note 8, at 133−35 (noting some difficulties, in the 1960s, of treating 
sit-ins as protected speech).  
  203.  Hunter, supra note 20, at 1696.  
  204.  See id. (“The idea of identity is more complicated and unstable than either simply status 
or conduct. It encompasses explanation and representation of the self.”). 
ZICK FINAL 2017 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2017 1:38 PM 
2017] FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EQUALITY 63 
acceptance were contentious and deeply divisive. Judges, who were 
already predisposed to defer to government employers and military 
officials, were not willing to extend full free speech protection to all 
forms of sexual dissent.205 
In sum, the recognition and robust exercise of First Amendment 
rights creates an environment in which equality and other rights can 
eventually achieve social and legal recognition. However, free speech 
arguments and precedents alone cannot compel recognition of any 
right whose time has not yet come. 
6.  Free Speech Rights Have an Exclusionary Dimension 
 The Free Speech Clause protects the views of opponents and 
detractors to the same extent that it protects equality’s supporters and 
advocates. The right to dissent entails the right to reject the dignity of 
others, to deny their entitlement to equality, and to exclude them from 
some of the benefits of civil society. 
During the civil rights era, the Free Speech Clause was primarily 
invoked as a sword to advance equality claims. In contrast, during an 
important phase of the gay equality movement, the Free Speech Clause 
was used as an effective shield against inclusion and equality.206 As 
mechanisms of dissent, free speech rights can be invoked to deny and 
thwart acceptance and equality. Opponents of inclusion successfully 
relied on First Amendment rights to oppose equal acceptance and, in 
some cases, equal treatment of gay men and lesbians. This resulted in 
exclusion from civic and social spaces, and the denial of certain 
opportunities to participate as full and equal citizens. 
This exclusionary dimension is a complicating aspect of the free 
speech-equality dynamic. Although the First Amendment’s 
exclusionary dimension may stall or impede recognition of equality 
rights, it also prevents government from dictating an orthodoxy 
regarding equality. The Free Speech Clause preserves breathing space 
for dissent and opposition to reform and interpretive change. In these 
respects, in the long term rights to dissent may benefit equality 
advocates. Dissenting First Amendment rights, in the form of 
exclusionary rights, also allow opponents and detractors time to process 
what full inclusion and equality might entail, and whether it will in fact 
 
  205.  See Eskridge, supra note 78, at 1398 (“So long as a minority is truly powerless, the 
judiciary will not challenge the political process openly.”). 
  206.  See id. at 1409 (making the sword-shield observation).  
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have any harmful consequences. More importantly, perhaps, in terms of 
democratic processes, exclusionary and dissenting rights allow judicial 
actors to proclaim that after a full and fair debate about equality a 
ruling in its favor is more democratically legitimate. 
7.  Governments Have Speech Rights, Too 
Governments and public officials have always been important 
voices in equality discourse. Whereas the concept of government 
speech immunity is relatively new, the concept of the government 
speaker is as old as the republic. Through official acts and 
pronouncements, governments are frequent communicators. One of 
the topics they have weighed in on – repeatedly – is the right to equal 
treatment under law. 
A full-blown theory of governmental rights speech – official 
communications about or concerning constitutional rights – has not yet 
been developed. As discussed in Part I, some scholars have offered 
suggestions regarding how discriminatory and other problematic 
government expression might be constitutionally limited by expressive 
rights and principles.207 Some of those suggestions involve using the 
Free Speech Clause to protect democratic processes from government 
speech that inhibits debate or chills discussion. 
One of the poignant lessons of both the race and LGBT equality 
movements is that governments wield extraordinary and generally 
unbridled authority to express their views regarding the social 
acceptance, political rights, and constitutional status of despised 
minorities. Any account of the relationship between free speech and 
equality rights must factor in the biggest, most powerful, and loudest 
speaker in the debate. It must also come to terms with the relative 
paucity of constitutional limits on government expression. 
8.  The Effects on Rights Are Bi-Directional 
As advocacy on behalf of equality shows, free speech rights are both 
transformative and themselves subject to transformation. Thus, we 
cannot simply look to see what effect expressive rights have had on 
constitutional equality. We must also examine the effects of equality 
advocacy on First Amendment expressive rights. 
Civil rights proponents sometimes face difficult strategic 
considerations regarding whether – and, if so, when and how – to invoke 
 
  207.  See supra Part I.E. 
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free speech rights. When they do so, advocates may experience either 
gains or losses in terms of advancing equality claims. However, 
expressive rights are also in play. This is true, as well, when civil rights 
activists press claims for inclusion which are then met with First 
Amendment defenses or claims of exclusionary rights. As Part II 
showed, here, too, free speech rights can be significantly affected. 
During the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, the effects 
on First Amendment rights were generally positive. Indeed, they have 
generally been celebrated as gains not only for equality, but for 
freedoms of speech, press, and association.208 During the race equality 
movement, equality and free speech rights worked synergistically 
toward the end of facilitating both rights. 
By contrast, the LGBT equality movement has presented a more 
complicated narrative. As discussed earlier, several free speech 
principles have been affirmed and strengthened during the 
movement.209 However, there have also been some negative effects. 
Identity speech claims failed. Associational rights were arguably 
destabilized, distorted, and sometimes merged into other rights. In one 
case, the right to anonymous speech was limited – although likely 
preserved in most respects. 
Of course, negative precedents and effects can arise any time First 
Amendment rights are invoked in the unpredictable realm of 
constitutional litigation. However, equality claimants should be 
especially mindful of how free speech rights can be affected by this sort 
of invocation. As repeat players, civil rights advocates are likely to 
frequently press social and jurisprudential boundaries. This places 
significant pressure on free speech concepts, principles, and doctrines. 
And since free speech rights are cumulative and iterative, the effects 
extend beyond the current constitutional moment or conflict. 
This is not to suggest that equality advocates ought to stay the 
sword, or fear the shield. However, a two-dimensional understanding 
of the relationship between expressive and equality rights might inform 
the strategic choices of equality claimants in terms of whether to bring 
free speech claims or how to frame such claims when they are brought. 
9.  Free Speech Rights Typically “Weigh” More Than Other Rights 
This lesson is related to the one immediately above. One of the 
 
  208.  See generally KALVEN, supra note 8. 
  209.  See supra Parts II.D. & II.E. 
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complications associated with the relationship between First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights is the possible balance or tradeoff that 
can occur between these two guarantees. This was less evident during 
the civil rights movement, when expressive gains tended to facilitate 
equality gains. Derogatory racist speech was generally protected and 
some identity speech claims failed. However, as interpreted by courts, 
First and Fourteenth Amendments largely operated in tandem. 
Again, the situation was more complicated during the LGBT 
equality movement. During the earliest era of that movement, free 
speech rights facilitated equality claims much as they had during the 
civil rights era.210 However, First Amendment litigation was only 
partially coordinated, and private parties opposed to gay and lesbian 
inclusion invoked the First Amendment for their own purposes. As a 
result, in subsequent phases of the movement there was a degree of 
conflict or tension between expressive and equality rights. 
In some instances, the Court appeared to roughly balance 
constitutional rights. This sort of tension and balance is not unique to 
equality claims. For example, free speech rights have conflicted with the 
right to privacy, religious liberties, the right to vote, and the right to a 
fair trial.211 In cases where there is a direct conflict between expressive 
and non-expressive rights, speech rights frequently prevail. For 
example, in Hurley and Dale, the Court enforced expressive rights that 
were in conflict with anti-discrimination laws. 
Equality activists must be aware of the tensions and tradeoffs 
associated with First Amendment agitation on behalf of equality rights. 
They should also know that when equality and free speech rights 
conflict, First Amendment rights will often prevail. 
10.  Free Speech Rights Eventually Recede Into the Background 
Over time, the focus in equality movements shifts from First 
Amendment rights to substantive equality concerns. Activists 
eventually turn their First Amendment victories into political gains. 
 
  210.  See supra Part I.A. 
  211.  See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (holding that privacy interest in 
contents of private conversation gave way to public interest in dissemination of information of 
public concern); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840−42 (1995) 
(holding that provision of student funds to Christian publication did not violate Establishment 
Clause); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding limits on 
campaign speech near polls); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560−61 (1976) (noting that 
free press and fair trial rights sometimes clash, and that press has an obligation to safeguard the 
fairness of trial proceedings).  
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There is a sunset or twilight phase, when First Amendment agitation 
begins to wane and free speech claims and rights start to recede into 
the background. 
During the race equality movement, the First Amendment was a 
critical tool for advancing racial equality. Eventually, however, race 
equality advocates moved to translate their expressive and other 
victories into substantive legislative and constitutional equality gains. 
First Amendment rights facilitated political advocacy, which in turn 
produced substantive equality advances such as the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.212 To be sure, rights to assemble, 
publish, and communicate remained critically important throughout 
the civil rights era – indeed, they remain important today. Discourse 
regarding constitutional rights, including equality, is perpetual. 
However, certainly after the 1960s, free speech claims and rights took a 
back seat to more pressing substantive equality concerns. In sum, 
during early phases of the civil rights movement, First Amendment 
rights were important catalysts for raising awareness; however, over 
time, activists turned their attention and resources to recognition of 
substantive equality rights. 
A similar pattern has been present with regard to the LGBT 
equality movement. During early phases of the movement, First 
Amendment claims were the focus of attention. Once LGBT persons 
obtained recognition for First Amendment rights, they too began to 
focus elsewhere. Particularly after Obergefell, in constitutional 
litigation gay men and lesbians are likely to look to the Equal 
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause rather than the Free 
Speech Clause. 
This does not mean that free speech and other First Amendment 
claims will completely cease to arise. Nor does it mean that the First 
Amendment will play no role in terms of mediating public debate 
concerning LGBT equality.213 Further, individuals and organizations 
may continue to assert dissenting and exclusionary First Amendment 
claims in response to anti-discrimination mandates. However, even in 
this context freedom of speech and association claims are likely to give 
 
  212.  See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 11 (tracing the constitutional and political 
processes by which significant civil rights laws were eventually enacted).  
  213.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642−43 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I 
assume that those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of 
their homes, but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk being labeled as bigots and 
treated as such by governments, employers, and schools.”). 
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ground to other constitutional and political protections. Owing in part 
to the relative strength of free speech and other claims, many objectors 
will likely focus on religious liberty rights rather than free speech rights 
to preserve organizational and expressive autonomy.  
B.  Different Equalities 
Despite their commonalities and shared lessons, there are some 
critical differences between the race and LGBT equality movements 
insofar as their intersection with First Amendment rights is concerned. 
Of course, these two movements arose in starkly different historical, 
political, social, and constitutional environments. We cannot fully 
examine all of their relevant distinctions or all aspects of the distinctive 
challenges and strategies that affected these equality movements. 
Further, in some respects, the race example may defy comparison to 
other equality movements. However, in terms of the relationship 
between free speech and equality rights, we can identify two 
distinctions of note – one general, and the other more specific in nature. 
One obvious distinction is the almost universally positive and 
synergistic relationship between free speech and equality during the 
race equality movement – as compared to the more complicated 
narrative of the LGBT equality movement. Part of the reason for the 
distinction may relate to the discipline and centralization of the race 
equality movement’s free speech litigation activities. What Professor 
Kalven has referred to as the NAACP’s “assault on the Constitution” 
was a masterful use of litigation to open the valves of a clogged political 
process through expressive agitation and litigation.214 Assemblies, 
protests, sit-ins and other expressive action were a critical part of the 
strategy. 
To be sure, the LGBT equality movement did not lack coordination; 
particularly in its early phases, the movement relied on litigation tactics 
similar to those of the civil rights movement. However, even then the 
litigation successes were more halting, less certain, and incomplete. 
Again, there are likely a multitude of reasons for this – chief among 
them, the closeting of gays and lesbians and the repressive sex culture 
in the United States. However, we should not underestimate the 
significance of the NAACP’s master plan to dismantle racial apartheid 
in part through First Amendment litigation. 
 
 
  214.  KALVEN, supra note 8, at 66. 
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On a more substantive level, in order to explain the distinctive 
experiences of these movements we need to turn our attention to the 
nature and character of equality rights that prevailed during these 
respective movements. In particular, we need to consider the relative 
strength of constitutional equality rights when the respective First 
Amendment agitation occurred. 
During the 1960s, First Amendment claims brought by civil rights 
activists had strong support at the Supreme Court. A decade after 
Brown v. Board of Education215 was decided, and in the face of 
continued resistance to its ruling, the Warren Court was determined to 
allow racial equality advocates to utilize expressive claims to attack 
segregation. While not all such claims succeeded, free speech and other 
First Amendment rights were a critical mechanism for advancing civil 
rights in the face of continued southern resistance. Equality proponents 
were thus armed with two enforceable constitutional rights. 
No similar judicial commitment to gay and lesbian equality existed 
during any phase of First Amendment litigation or agitation. Simply 
put, there was nothing like Brown to support the expressive claims of 
gay equality advocates. Indeed, it was not until the 1990s that the 
Supreme Court held that states and their people could not literally 
deny gay men and lesbians fundamental equality rights.216 However, the 
prohibition on literal denials of equal protection did not translate into 
broad support for First Amendment claims. Thus, unlike the civil rights 
movement, the LGBT equality movement lacked any substantive 
Fourteenth Amendment support for its First Amendment agenda. 
Without this critical Fourteenth Amendment tail wind, activists 
found that the moral force of the First Amendment was simply not 
strong enough on its own to protect associational rights, defeat all forms 
of sex censorship, or prevent employment and other forms of exclusion. 
This helps to explain why Professor Eskridge and others have 
described gay and lesbian First Amendment litigation, particularly 
during the 1960s and 1970s, as only “relatively successful.”217 Relative 
to the race equality movement, the LGBT equality movement was at a 
distinct disadvantage in terms of Fourteenth Amendment support. 
 
  215.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
  216.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (invalidating state constitutional 
amendment that denied basic equality rights to gay men and lesbians).  
  217.  ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 111. See generally Rhonda Rivera, Our Straight-Laced 
Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 
(1979) (examining employment and other cases adjudicating the rights of gay men and lesbians).  
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One of the most intriguing distinctions between the race and sexual 
orientation equality movements, in terms of their intersection with First 
Amendment rights, was the reliance by opponents of inclusion and 
equality on exclusionary rights – i.e., protection against compelled 
speech and association.218 The Supreme Court’s acceptance of these 
claims represented a clear break from prior cases involving race and 
sex discrimination.219 Why didn’t we see such claims during the civil 
rights movement? And why were they so successful during the LGBT 
equality movement? 
During the 1960s, opponents of racial equality did not generally 
look to the First Amendment as a source of exclusionary rights. They 
did not generally need to do so. Public accommodation and anti-
discrimination laws were largely non-existent or, where they existed, 
under-enforced. Moreover, segregationists did not generally need First 
Amendment rights to combat desegregation. They could rely on state 
action limitations, private property rights, and old-fashioned means of 
self-help to support most forms of racial exclusion. 
Further, even if segregationists had wanted to do so, raising 
exclusionary First Amendment defenses posed strategic and doctrinal 
difficulties. The Supreme Court did not formally recognize the First 
Amendment right of expressive association until the 1950s.220 When it 
did so, the Court extolled the right as a means of resisting racial 
oppression and inequality. It would have been incongruous, to say the 
least, for the Court to simultaneously recognize a negative right of 
association that would have lent support to de jure racial segregation. 
During the LGBT equality movement, by contrast, opponents of 
inclusion were faced with a proliferation of broadly interpreted anti-
discrimination laws. State action and property rights arguments were 
not viable defenses to these laws. However, by then, First Amendment 
exclusionary rights had become more viable. By the 1990s, rights 
against compelled speech and association had already developed a 
respectable pedigree.221 And again, defenders of exclusion did not have 
 
  218.  See discussion supra Part I.D. 
  219.  See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988). (invalidating racially 
discriminatory exclusion policies); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 
537 544 (1940) (same). See also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628−29 (holding that 
application of state anti-discrimination law to require Jaycees to admit women as full voting 
members did not violate the First Amendment). 
  220.  See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (recognizing right of 
anonymous expressive association).  
  221.  See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977) (First Amendment protects right 
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to argue around any Brown-like precedent affirming gay and lesbian 
equality. 
Meanwhile, in the Fourteenth Amendment area, the Supreme 
Court developed a tiered scrutiny approach under which racial 
discrimination was highly suspect but other classifications received 
weaker judicial scrutiny.222 Sexual orientation has never been treated 
by the Court as a suspect trait. The interpretation and application of 
tiered scrutiny improved the chances that First Amendment 
associational rights would outweigh LGBT equality concerns. This 
helps to explain why exclusionary claims were unsuccessful with regard 
to racially exclusionary policies, but had more traction when it came to 
LGBT exclusion. 
What is perhaps most interesting with regard to the distinctions 
discussed in this Section is the role that the Fourteenth Amendment 
has played in terms of civil rights movements’ experiences with First 
Amendment claims. Conceptions of substantive equality have 
significantly affected both the general efficacy and specific nature of 
expressive claims. As these basic distinctions indicate, while First 
Amendment rights can press equality claims forward or hold them 
back, Fourteenth Amendment rights can also facilitate or impede First 
Amendment claims. 
C.  Transgender Equality 
Despite the Obergefell decision, gay and lesbian equality has not 
yet been fully realized. I have argued that First Amendment free speech 
claims and rights will play a relatively reserved role as the scope of this 
equality is worked out in future conflicts. Meanwhile, the affiliated – 
but in certain respects distinctive – campaign for transgender equality 
has already begun.223 What do the lessons and comparative analysis 
discussed in this Section suggest with regard to such next-generation 
equality movements? 
Many of the general lessons discussed above apply to the 
transgender example. Free speech rights are antecedent to transgender 
equality rights. Indeed, these rights have already contributed to a 
 
not to be compelled to display state messages on license plate).  
  222.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (discussing tiered 
scrutiny approach). 
  223.  Although this Article, like most commentary, tends to collectively refer to gay, lesbian, 
and transgender persons, the transgender equality movement will face some unique challenges. 
Thus, it is worth examining the movement’s relationship to free speech rights separately.  
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cultural and political discourse regarding sexual orientation that has 
made possible rapid advances in terms of transgender equality rights. 
In a relatively short period of time, as a result of the exercise of free 
speech rights transgendered persons have gained a remarkable 
measure of social and political acceptance.224 
As it has in the past, the Free Speech Clause will continue to 
function as an important catalyst for transgender equality. It will 
provide breathing space for transgender claims, as well as opportunities 
to persuade the public and public officials to grant full equality rights 
to transgender persons. 
Nevertheless, insofar as the Free Speech Clause is concerned, there 
will also be some notable distinctions between the experiences of past 
equality claimants and the likely path of transgender equality 
proponents. For one thing, transgendered persons will not be required 
to devote significant resources to attaining basic free speech rights – 
i.e., rights to protest, associate, and publish. This does not mean that 
transgender equality advocates will cease to protest, assemble in public, 
associate in common causes, or distribute information about 
themselves. However, transgender and other equality advocates will 
not be forced to expend considerable resources in obtaining the basic 
expressive rights that race and other equality advocates litigated during 
early phases of their movements. These battles have now been 
decisively won, and transgender equality advocates are well-positioned 
to piggy-back on past precedents and successes. As noted, they have 
already benefitted significantly from the cumulative free speech rights 
established by predecessor movements. 
As in past equality movements, matters of self-identity and 
exclusion will be important to the success of the transgender equality 
movement. As have their predecessors, transgender plaintiffs may bring 
their own unique free speech claims. For example, many jurisdictions 
have enacted “bathroom bills” that limit a person’s use of restrooms by 
reference to the gender on the birth certificate.225 Among other 
constitutional provisions, plaintiffs may argue that these laws violate 
 
  224.  See Clyde Haberman, Beyond Caitlyn Jenner Lies a Long Struggle by Transgender 
People, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/us/beyond-caitlyn-
jenner-lies-a-long-struggle-by-transgender-people.html?_r=0 (discussing change in public 
attitudes toward transgender persons). 
 225.  See Neil J. Young, How the Bathroom Wars Shaped America, POLITICO (MAY 18, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-bathroom-bills-politics-north-carolina-
lgbt-transgender-history-restrooms-era-civil-rights-213902, (reporting that fifteen states have 
considered “bathroom bills”).  
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the Free Speech Clause by suppressing a form of gender expression or 
compelling them to assert and/or prove gender identity. Similarly, 
transgender students may challenge school dress codes and appearance 
restrictions on free speech grounds. In that event, litigants and courts 
may need to consider and distinguish past free speech identity speech 
claims, which generally failed. 
However, Obergefell v. Hodges suggests that transgender litigants 
may not need to turn to the Free Speech Clause in order to defeat 
restrictions on gender expression. In its opening lines, Obergefell states 
that the Constitution protects “a liberty that includes certain specific 
rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express 
their identity.”226 Obergefell thus explicitly recognizes the 
expressiveness of sexual and other forms of identity, and incorporates 
protection for personal identity into the Due Process Clause and Equal 
Protection Clause. This may obviate, or at least lessen, the need to rely 
upon the Free Speech Clause as a guarantor of gender identity 
expression. 
Opponents of transgender inclusion and participation may also 
turn to the First Amendment’s exclusionary dimension to defend their 
organizational prerogatives or resist compelled communication.227 In 
these cases, transgender equality advocates may have to confront 
Dale’s compulsory association doctrine. 
However, there are reasons to think that First Amendment 
exemption claims may not be as successful in this context. Dale does 
not provide absolute protection against compelled inclusion. The 
decision appears to have been limited by precedents like FAIR, the case 
involving the law schools and military recruiters. Dale’s balance of free 
speech and equality interests could also be affected by Obergefell’s 
recognition of the equality and due process rights of gay men and 
lesbians. 
Insofar as identity speech and exclusionary rights are concerned, 
the decades-long debate over gender-bending behaviors and spectral 
sexuality has likely altered the constitutional landscape. During the 
transgender equality movement, the Free Speech Clause and related 
 
  226.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (emphasis added). 
 227.  See William Petroski, Churches Challenge State on Gender Identity Law, DES MOINES 
REGISTER (July 6, 2016, 6:43AM) http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2016/07 
/05/church-sues-state-iowa-over-transgender-bathroom-rules/86700392/ (reporting on a federal 
lawsuit filed by a church raising free speech and religious liberty claims against state civil rights 
law concerning transgender discrimination). 
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expressive guarantees will likely play more reserved roles or functions 
relative to prior movements. Further, institutional resistance to 
transgender equality will likely be weaker than it has been with regard 
to previous sexuality-based equality claims. The military’s recent repeal 
of the ban on transgender service provides some evidence in support 
of this claim. Unlike gay men and lesbians, transgendered persons will 
not need to rely on the Free Speech Clause to open many doors that 
have been closed to them. Instead, they will rely more heavily on 
constitutional equality and dignity arguments, and on legislative and 
administrative protections. 
Finally, like their predecessors, transgender persons may be subject 
to discriminatory government speech. In that event, there may be 
additional opportunities to develop academic arguments that official 
enactments are limited by the First Amendment’s free speech 
guarantee.228 The idea may be worth exploring – particularly if 
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine fails to provide strong support for 
transgender equality rights. However, as discussed previously, official 
communications denigrating transgendered persons are likely to be less 
common than pronouncements of racial apartheid or no promo homo 
policies. 
Although First Amendment rights and principles will remain 
important to the transgender equality movement’s success, First 
Amendment agitation is likely to play a less prominent role in the 
movement. Although free speech claims will certainly arise on both 
sides of the transgender equality issue, freedom of speech will probably 
twilight or recede into the background after only a relatively brief 
period. Transgendered students and others are currently invoking Title 
IX and other federal and state anti-discrimination provisions, and these 
disputes are already headed for Supreme Court review.229 Going 
forward, legal conflicts will focus less on First Amendment claims and 
more on civil rights provisions relating to employment, marriage, 
adoption, and access to public facilities. In sum, the focus will shift from 
short-term and interim free speech rights to the establishment of more 
long-term substantive equality rights. 
 
 228.  See supra Part I.E. 
 229.  See, e.g., C.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 720 (4th Cir. 2016) (concluding 
that Department of Education’s interpretation of Title IX requirements relating to transgender 
bathroom use were entitled to deference), mandate stayed by Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. C.G., __ 
S. Ct. __, 2016 WL 4131636 (S. Ct. Aug. 3, 2016). 
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CONCLUSION 
Over the course of two successive civil rights movements, the Free 
Speech Clause and other expressive guarantees have facilitated and 
advanced constitutional equality and managed a sometimes tense 
public discourse concerning equality rights. Free speech rights have 
been antecedent to Fourteenth Amendment rights. They have been 
important catalysts for social, political, and constitutional change. 
However, as a means of securing constitutional equality, First 
Amendment rights and principles are subject to serious limitations. 
Freedom of speech does not guarantee the success of equality claims 
or movements. Indeed, it can confound and disappoint equality 
proponents, as it did when claims were rejected, exclusions validated, 
and discriminatory government speech was left unconstrained. 
The relationship between free speech and equality guarantees is bi-
directional. Reliance on First Amendment rights to advance 
Fourteenth Amendment equality claims can place considerable stress 
on free speech doctrines and principles. The race equality movement 
highlighted the synergistic and cooperative aspects of this relationship. 
The LGBT equality movement demonstrated that First Amendment 
rights can be fortified by equality advocacy, but that they can also 
experience distortion and possible diminution. 
Assessed comparatively, the race and LGBT equality movements 
show that not all equalities are alike in their interaction with free 
speech rights. Cross-doctrinal influences, in particular the relative 
strength of equality rights, can have a significant effect on the success 
and nature of First Amendment claims. 
These lessons and observations are important for a fuller 
understanding of the complicated and complicating relationship 
between freedom of speech and equal protection. They can also be 
applied to present and future equality movements, including the 
ongoing campaign for transgender equality. With regard to transgender 
equality, free speech rights function as antecedent, facilitative, and 
catalytic rights. However, free speech claims are likely to play a far less 
prominent role in the transgender equality movement than they have 
in the past. Indeed, we may already be witnessing the “sunsetting” of 
the free speech phase of the transgender equality movement. 
